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* Professor Curtis Hayes, J.D., is Chair of the Department of Behavioral
Sciences at Western New Mexico University in Silver City. Prior to becoming a fulltime educator in 1993, he practiced law in New Mexico for ten years, primarily as a
prosecutor. This paper is an updated and revised version of an unpublished paper
presented at the Southwestern Association of Criminal Justice Annual Conference in
October 1999. The author thanks Mary Lynne Newell, J.D., and Andrew L. Warren,
J.D., for proofreading assistance and Alexandra Wilson and Tessa Ryan for editorial
assistance. Also, John Tate, training officer for the New Mexico Rangers, whose
listserv of updates on New Mexico cases and e-mail discussions motivate me to stay
current on search and seizure law.
1. 1997-NMSC-006, 932 P.2d 1.
2. See infra text accompanying note 18.
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Application of the New Mexico Constitution’s protections regarding
search and seizure can lead to better outcomes for criminal defendants
than application of the Fourth Amendment protections enshrined in the
U.S. Constitution. In State v. Gomez,1 the New Mexico Supreme Court
adopted an approach to constitutional analysis that serves as a guide to
attorneys seeking these protections for their clients. In Gomez and in
subsequent rulings, New Mexico courts have applied that approach in a
wide range of search and seizure contexts, including pretextual stops,
questioning of drivers and passengers, vehicle searches, roadblocks and
checkpoints, and probationer/parolee searches.
This article briefly examines four approaches to state versus federal
constitutional decision making and the precedent that led to the New
Mexico Supreme Court’s adoption of the interstitial approach to search
and seizure analysis.2 The article then reviews those cases in which New
Mexico appellate courts have held that the New Mexico Constitution’s
analog to the Fourth Amendment offers greater protection than the
nearly identical language of the Fourth Amendment.
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II. NEW FEDERALISM AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
In the early 1970s, state appellate courts across the country began to
examine whether state constitutions offered different or better protections than those found in the federal Bill of Rights. This movement became known as New Federalism.3 Since then, four theoretical constructs
have emerged. Each outlines when, if ever, a state court should apply
state constitutional protections in addition to federal protections.
A. Historical Background
In 1961, the ruling in Mapp v. Ohio4 triggered the “due process
revolution,” whereby almost all of the procedural rights delineated in the
Bill of Rights were incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and made applicable to the states.5 Prior to that time,
state constitutions served as the “primary protectors of individual
rights.”6
State courts often failed in that protective role.7 The due process
revolution stemmed from a negative assumption about state courts:
Without the Supreme Court to stand over [the states], ready to
review and reverse, the state courts would fail to provide the minimal rights that all defendants were entitled to at all times. In
short, incorporation was motivated by the Mississippi Problem:
the assumption that the state bench was, at its worst, racist and
incompetent, and merely competent most of the time.8

The federalization of constitutional criminal procedure in the 1960s
meant that state courts could and did ignore state constitutions.9 But in
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3. See e.g., Donald E. Wilkes Jr., The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure:
State Court Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 KY. L.J. 421 (1974).
4. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
5. Rights not incorporated include the right to grand jury review, Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), the right to a twelve person jury, Williams v. Florida,
399 U.S. 78 (1970), and the right to a unanimous jury verdict, Apodaca v. Oregon, 406
U.S. 404 (1972). The Supreme Court has never explicitly incorporated the Eight
Amendment rights to no excessive bail or fines.
6. Rachel A. Van Cleave, State Constitutional Interpretation and Methodology, 28
N.M. L. REV. 199, 201 (1998).
7. Barry Latzer, Toward the Decentralization of Criminal Procedure: State Constitutional Law and Selective Disincorporation, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 63, 65
(1996).
8. Id.
9. Shirley Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The Emergence of
State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1141, 1144–45 (1985).
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the early 1970s, some state jurists became concerned that the U.S. Supreme Court was retreating in its protection of individual rights and began to re-examine their own constitutions.10 This impetus came from both
“liberal” and “conservative” quarters. Liberals might have been expected
to support an interpretation that comported with federal rights and protections, and they did.11 Conservatives, who traditionally supported state
sovereignty and rights, argued in favor of using state constitutions to “return states to their original role of protecting the rights of people in their
states. . . .”12 Some from the conservative perspective argued that the
time had come to begin “dis-incorporating” from the Fourteenth Amendment those rights “not demonstrably essential to the safeguarding of fundamental rights.”13
To an extent, the U.S. Supreme Court encouraged state courts to
use state constitutions as the basis for their rulings. For example, in
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robbins, the court held that the California
Constitution14 could apply where the First Amendment did not.15 In Michigan v. Long,16 the Court wrote that “[i]f the state court decision indicates
clearly and expressly that it is . . . based on bona fide separate, adequate,
and independent grounds, we, of course, will not undertake to review the
decision.”17
Many states have taken the Supreme Court up on its offer to leave
them alone. State courts tend to fall into four camps on the issue of when
to engage in independent analysis of a state constitutional provision.18

R

02/11/2014 12:56:22

C M
Y K

R
R

33613-nmx_43-2 Sheet No. 46 Side A

10. William Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 495–02 (1977). This article is sometimes heralded as triggering
the emergence of the New Federalism, however, as noted in Justice Brennan’s article,
it had already begun with decisions in California, New Jersey, Hawaii, Michigan,
South Dakota, and Maine, and it had already been the subject of several law review
articles.
11. See e.g., J. Thomas Sullivan, Developing a State Constitutional Law Strategy in
New Mexico Criminal Prosecutions, 39 N.M. L. REV. 407, 410 (2009) (discussing the
movement as a reaction to the “conservative shift” of the U.S. Supreme Court).
12. Van Cleave, supra note 6, at 201.
13. Latzer, supra note 7, at 129.
14. CAL. CONST. art I, § 2 (“Every person may freely speak, write and publish his
or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law
may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press.”). CAL. CONST. art I, § 3
(“[P]eople have the right to . . . petition government for redress of grievances”).
15. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
16. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
17. Id. at 3476. The court labeled this holding the “plain statement” rule. Id. at
3477 n.7.
18. Van Cleave, supra note 6, at 206; see also Jennifer Cutcliffe Juste, Note, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—The Effect of State Constitutional Interpretation on New
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The camps are variously labeled, but here are referred to as “lockstep,”
“interstitial,” “dual sovereignty,” and “primacy.”
B. Four Approaches to New Federalism
Under the lockstep approach—also called the “dependent interpretation,” “parallelism,” “clone,” and “absolute harmony” approach19—
which assumes that when the language defining a particular right in the
federal and state constitutions is either identical or “substantially
equivalent,” the federal interpretation applies.20 The primary argument in
favor of the lockstep approach is uniformity in the law.21 As Colorado
Chief Justice Ericson stated in his dissent in a Colorado case, People v.
Corr, “law enforcement officers . . . should not have to anticipate that a
federally guaranteed right will be given broader interpretation under an
all but identical provision in a state constitution.”22 Professor Rachel Van
Cleave noted that the primary argument against this approach is that
“state constitutions . . . were products of different periods of history, different areas of the country, with different concerns in mind, as compared
to the circumstances surrounding the drafting of the National
Constitution.”23
The “interstitial” approach has been referred to as the “supplemental” or the “second-look” approach.24 Under interstitial analysis, the state
court first examines whether the governmental action in controversy violates the federal Constitution. If so, the federal interpretation is applied.
If not, then the court examines whether the comparable state constitutional provision provides broader protections.25
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Mexico’s Civil and Criminal Procedure—State v. Gomez, 28 N.M. L. REV. 355, 357
(1998). The analysis of state court decisions concerning departure from federal precedent in these articles is not new, but they both contain good summaries of the arguments for and against each position.
19. Van Cleave, supra note 6, at 207.
20. See Blair v. Pitchess, 486 P.2d 1242, 1251, n.6 (1971). Florida has mandated
this approach in its search and seizure jurisprudence by way of a constitutional
amendment adopted in 1982, which provides “[t]his right shall be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by
the United States Supreme Court.” FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12.
21. David Henderson, Setting the Ground Rules for a Conversation in Progress, 3
N.M. BAR J. 42, 45–46 (1997).
22. 682 P.2d 20, 33 (Colo. 1984) (Erickson, J. dissenting).
23. Van Cleave, supra note 6, at 208.
24. Id. at 209.
25. Cutcliffe Juste, supra note 18, at 359.
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In an often-cited26 concurring opinion,27 Justice Handler of the New
Jersey Supreme Court listed seven circumstances in which it would be
appropriate for a state court to find that a state constitutional provision
had a scope different from its analog in the Bill of Rights: (1) the language of the comparable provision is sufficiently different;28 (2) the state’s
legislative history reveals such intent;29 (3) state law predates adoption of
the state constitutional provision;30 (4) the state and federal constitutional
provisions differ structurally (for example, a provision in the Bill of
Rights might be expressed as a restriction on government, e.g., “Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,” not as a positive
affirmation, e.g., “[e]very person may freely speak, write, and publish his
sentiments on all subjects.”);31 (5) a matter is of particular state interest or
local concern;32 (6) a state has distinctive history or traditions;33 or (7) a
state’s citizens have distinctive attitudes.34
Critics of the interstitial approach argue that it makes a state constitution inferior to the federal Constitution. Decisions in which a state constitutional provision prevails are criticized as unduly “result oriented,”35
that they represent unwarranted judicial activism on the part of liberal
state court judges,36 and that they lead to a lack of uniformity in the law.37
Under the dual sovereignty approach, a state court analyzes both
state and federal constitutional provisions in every case in which a constitutional claim is pressed.38 Arguments for and against this approach resemble those of the interstitial approach,39 but critics also argue that the
dual sovereignty approach violates the principle that cases should be decided narrowly.40 That is, if the governmental action violates one constitution, then a court should not indulge in analysis of the other constitution.

R
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26. E.g., State v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 2001-NMSC-017, ¶ 35, 25 P.3d 225, 239 (citing State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952 (N.J. 1982) (Handler, J., concurring)).
27. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952 (Handler, J., concurring).
28. Id. at 965.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 966.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Van Cleave, supra note 6, at 209.
36. See, e.g., Paul Kahn, State Constitutionalism and the Problem of Fairness, 30
VAL. U. L. REV. 459 (1996).
37. Henderson, supra note 21.
38. Van Cleave, supra note 6, at 211.
39. See id.
40. Cutcliffe Juste, supra note 18, at 360.
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The primacy approach is the converse of the interstitial approach:
the state court examines whether the governmental action violates the
state, not the federal, constitution.41 Only if the state constitution approves the governmental action does the state court examine the federal
constitution.
The arguments in favor of the primacy approach resemble those in
favor of the interstitial approach. Proponents add that the primacy approach returns a state constitution to its historical role as the primary
source of individual liberties vis-à-vis state governmental action.42 Moreover, the primacy approach encourages judicial economy, as it subjects
fewer decisions to U.S. Supreme Court review.43 Critics contend that state
courts, removed from the discourse on the federal Constitution, create
inconsistency in the law44 and that no state’s needs are so individual as to
justify deviating from the national standard.45
III. STATE V. GOMEZ: NEW MEXICO’S INTERSTITIAL
APPROACH TO FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
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41. Van Cleave, supra note 6, at 214.
42. Id. at 215.
43. Cutcliffe Juste, supra note 18, at 359.
44. Id.
45. See James Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH.
L. REV. 761 (1992).
46. 1997-NMSC-006, 932 P.2d 1.
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In State v. Gomez,46 the New Mexico Supreme Court formally
adopted the interstitial approach for determining the scope of individual
rights in search and seizure cases. Accordingly, New Mexico courts look
first to the Fourth Amendment and federal interpretations to identify a
protected right; if none is found, then the courts analyze the issue under
article II, section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution.
Gomez addressed when it is appropriate for the nearly identical
search and seizure provisions of the federal and New Mexico constitutions to have different meanings. The federal provision—the Fourth
Amendment—provides:
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The comparable provision of the New Mexico Constitution—article II,
section 10—provides:
The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and
effects, from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant
to search any place, or seize any person or thing, shall issue without describing the place to be searched, or the persons or things to
be seized, nor without a written showing of probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation.

C M
Y K

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

¶ 4, 932 P.2d at 4.
¶ 5, 932 P.3d at 4.

¶ 6, 932 P.3d at 4.

¶ 8, 932 P.3d at 4.
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47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
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In adopting the interstitial approach, the Gomez court explored
whether a warrantless seizure of drug paraphernalia from a vehicle required exigent circumstances and, if it did, whether exigent circumstances
existed. In Gomez, a sheriff’s deputy was dispatched to a “party disturbance” and found approximately fifty to sixty people around a home in a
rural area.47 As the deputy approached the defendant’s car, the defendant
appeared to be stuffing something under the seat.48 The defendant got out
of the car, locked the door, and shut it as the deputy reached the side of
the car.49 The deputy smelled the odors of burned and unburned marijuana.50 The deputy handcuffed the defendant, searched him, and put him
in the police car.51 By then, several more officers had arrived.52 The deputy looked into the defendant’s car and saw, in plain view, a brass pipe, a
pair of hemostats, and some loose marijuana.53 The deputy searched the
defendant’s car and found a fanny pack containing tabs of paper he believed to be LSD.54
At a suppression hearing, the deputy’s testimony addressed whether
an emergency existed to justify the warrantless search.55 The deputy said
that he was concerned that he and the other officers might not be able to
secure the car in light of the number of potentially hostile onlookers. He
added that the car could have been removed if the police had left it unattended while obtaining a warrant.56
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The state relied on United States v. Ross57 and two New Mexico
cases in arguing that “probable cause alone justifie[d] searching a movable vehicle and its closed containers.”59 The defendant did not argue that
the officer lacked probable cause to search the vehicle. Rather, he argued
that, under the New Mexico Constitution, only exigent circumstances
could justify the warrantless search.60 The defendant supported his argument by citing a New Mexico case61 in which the warrantless search of a
burlap sack in a car parked at a sheriff’s office was held to be
unconstitutional.
Gomez noted that, until 1989, the state constitution had been interpreted in lockstep with the U.S. Constitution.62 Then, in State v. Cordova,63 the court held that the meaning of a state constitutional provision
may differ from its federal analog. The Cordova court, however, did not
identify circumstances under which deviating from the federal ruling was
appropriate. Gomez identified three circumstances under which a state
court using the interstitial approach may depart from federal precedent:
(1) when the federal analysis is “flawed”; (2) when there are “structural
58

R
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57. 456 U.S. 798 (1982). The holding of Ross that probable cause alone without
any showing of actual exigency justifies a warrantless search of an automobile was
reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Maryland. v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465 (1999). This
principle was first expounded in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), and is
often referred to as the Carroll Doctrine.”
58. State v. Pena, 108 N.M. 760, 779 P.2d 538 (1989); State v. Apodaca, 112 N.M.
302, 814 P.2d 1030 (Ct. App. 1991).
59. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 9, 932 P.2d at 5.
60. Id. ¶ 10, 932 P.2d at 5.
61. Id. (citing State v. Coleman, 87 N.M. 153, 530 P.2d 947 (Ct. App. 1974)). The
court in Coleman never mentioned which constitution had been violated. In any
event, the ruling was consistent with federal courts’ rulings at the time that closed
packages in vehicles were not covered by the bright-line rule that a movable vehicle
is, per se, an exigent circumstance. See Cutcliffe Juste, supra note 18, at 370.
62. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 16, 932 P.2d at 6. The earliest case cited by the
court as an example of the lockstep approach is State v. Garcia, which simply notes
that the Fourth Amendment and article II, section10 are “almost identical.” 76 N.M.
171, 174, 413 P.2d 210, 212 (1966). The court then conducts a Fourth Amendment
analysis without any further mention of article II, section10.
63. 109 N.M. 211, 784 P.2d 30 (1989), discussed infra note 87. Earlier cases note
that the New Mexico Constitution could be independently interpreted, but they have
not done so. See State v. Deltenre, 77 N.M. 497, 424 P.2d 782 (1967) (reviewing the
legality of an arrest based upon information supplied by a confidential informant);
State ex rel Serna v. Hodges, 89 N.M. 351, 552 P.2d 787 (1976) (reviewing the constitutionality of the death penalty).
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64. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 19, 932 P.2d at 7 (citing Colloquium, Developments in the Law: The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV.
1324, 1358 (1982)).
65. Id. ¶ 20, 932 P.2d at 7. This list of rationales replaces “structural differences
between state and federal government” with “undeveloped federal analogs;” however, subsequent cases most often refer to the list discussed supra note 64.
66. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 23, n.3, 932 P.2d at 8, n.3.
67. The court did not discuss or even mention the dual sovereignty approach.
68. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 21, 932 P.2d at 7 (quoting Colloquium, supra note
64, at 1358).
69. Id.

33613-nmx_43-2 Sheet No. 49 Side A

differences” between state and federal government; and (3) when “state
characteristics” are “distinctive.”64
The court commented that “[s]ince abandoning the lock-step model,
our tacit approach to interpretation of the New Mexico Constitution has
been interstitial, providing broader protection where we have found the
federal analysis unpersuasive either because we deemed it flawed, . . . or
because of distinctive state characteristics . . . or because of undeveloped
federal analogs.”65 In a footnote, the court added, “[w]e decline to follow
those states that require litigants to address . . . specified criteria for departing from federal interpretation of the federal counterpart.”66 Hence,
the court implied that, when interpreting the state constitution, there
might be other circumstances in which a departure from the federal ruling
is appropriate.
The court then explicitly adopted the interstitial approach, rather
than the primacy approach, for two reasons.67 First, the court stated that it
would be inefficient to develop state constitutional law independently,
“when parallel Federal issues have been exhaustively discussed by the
United States Supreme Court and commentators.”68 Second, the court
observed a general need for national uniformity concerning fundamental
constitutional rights.69
The court then used the interstitial approach to resolve the case. The
court noted that, “[u]nder current federal interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment, the constitutional protection against warrantless searches
and seizures admits of a bright-line exception that permits a warrantless
search of a lawfully stopped automobile and any closed containers in the
automobile.” The court explained the automobile exception in federal
law: (1) The inherent mobility of automobiles creates exigent circumstances and (2) a lower expectation of privacy attaches to the contents of
an automobile because of the “pervasive regulation of vehicles traveling

33613-nmx_43-2 Sheet No. 49 Side B
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on public highways.”70 The court ruled the deputy’s actions were valid
under the Fourth Amendment.71
The court then turned to article II, section 10 of the New Mexico
Constitution. The court noted that it had “consistently . . . expressed a
strong preference for warrants”72 and held that “a warrantless search of
an automobile and its contents requires a particularized showing of exigent circumstances.”73 The court continued:
By compelling the officer to show a neutral magistrate facts from
which that impartial judicial representative could conclude that
probable cause exists to justify searching that vehicle and its containers for contraband, the law enforcement organizations of this
state are prevented from allowing the competitive pressures of
fighting crime to compromise their judgment about whether or
not to carry out a given search.74

Without saying so, the court used the “flawed federal analysis” rationale as the justification for departing from the federal bright-line rule.
The court wrote:
[q]uite simply, if there is no reasonable basis for believing an automobile will be moved or its search will be otherwise compromised
by delay, then a warrant is required. While it may be true that in
most cases involving vehicles there will be exigent circumstances
justifying a warrantless search, we do not accept the federal bright
line automobile exception.75

IV. PRE-GOMEZ CASES IN NEW MEXICO
Although Gomez was the first case formally to adopt the interstitial
approach, New Mexico appellate courts had been using it prior to the

Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 34, 932 P.2d at 10–11.
Id.
Id. ¶ 36, 932 P.2d at 11.
Id. ¶ 39, 932 P.2d at 12.
Id. ¶ 38, 932 P.2d at 11–12.
Id. ¶ 44, 932 P.2d at 13 (emphasis in original).
Id. ¶ 43, 932 P.2d at 12.
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The departure from the federal bright-line rule did not help the defendant; the court ruled that it was objectively reasonable for the deputy
to believe that exigent circumstances existed.76 The search was legal and
the defendant’s conviction stood.
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Gomez decision. In State v.Cordova,77 the New Mexico Supreme Court
held that it would not follow the “totality of the circumstances” test established by U.S. Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates for probable cause
based upon unnamed informants.78 Instead, New Mexico would continue
to adhere to the more stringent Aguilar-Spinelli test.79
Under the Aguilar-Spinelli test, in order for information supplied by
an unnamed source to establish probable cause, two prongs must be met:
“basis of knowledge” and “credibility or reliability.”80 The “basis of
knowledge” prong requires that there be a substantial basis for the informant’s knowledge.81 The second prong requires that the informant be
reliable or credible.82 In Gates,83 the U.S. Supreme Court held that,
though these factors are relevant in establishing probable cause, the
Fourth Amendment does not require that they be met.84 Rather, the
Fourth Amendment requires only that the “totality of circumstances” establish probable cause.85
However, in New Mexico, the Cordova court ruled that the AguilarSpinelli test “better effectuate[s] the principles behind Article II, Section
10 of [the] Constitution than does the ‘totality of circumstances’ test set
out in Gates.”86 The court commented that the U.S. Supreme Court’s primary reason for abandoning the Aguilar-Spinelli test was that lower
courts were applying the test too rigidly.87 The Cordova court distinguished New Mexico in this context: New Mexico courts had not applied
the test too rigidly.88 The court explained:
We are convinced that our rules,89 while providing a flexible, common sense framework, also provide structure for the inquiry into

02/11/2014 12:56:22
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77. 109 N.M. 211, 784 P.2d 30 (1989).
78. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
79. Named after the U. S. Supreme Court cases Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108
(1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), this test was later abandoned
by the Supreme Court. Gates, 462 U.S. at 239.
80. Cordova, 109 N.M. at 212, 784 P.2d at 31.
81. Id. at 214, 784 P.2d at 33.
82. Id. at 213, 784 P.2d at 32.
83. Gates, 462 U.S. 213.
84. Id. at 241.
85. Id. at 238.
86. Cordova, 109 N.M. at 217, 784 P.2d at 36.
87. Id. at 215, 784 P.2d at 34. While the Cordova opinion did not elaborate on this,
in Illinois v. Gates the U.S. Supreme Court noted that “an elaborate set of legal rules”
had developed to enforce the Aguilar-Spinelli test. 462 U.S. 213, 229.
88. Cordova, 109 N.M. at 216, 784 P.2d at 36.
89. The requirements of the Aguilar-Spinelli test are embodied in Rule 5-211(E)
NMRA 1986.
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whether probable cause has been demonstrated. The fact that
“non-lawyers” are involved in drafting applications for search
warrants underscores rather than obviates the need for such
structure.90

While the interstitial approach calls first for an examination into
whether a governmental action violates the U.S. Constitution, the Cordova court skipped this step. The court never determined whether the
affidavit at issue was sufficient under the federal totality of the circumstances test.
The Gomez court cited Cordova as providing an example of “distinctive state characteristics” that justify independent analysis under the
state constitution.91 Gomez also cited a second example of the distinctive
state characteristics rationale, State v. Sutton.92 In Sutton, the court of appeals confronted the validity of a warrantless search of a rural parcel of
land on which two plots of marijuana were found.93 The court first reviewed rulings from the U.S. Supreme Court that established and refined
the open fields doctrine94 and determined that the plots, outside an
owner’s curtilage, were not protected under the Fourth Amendment.95
The Sutton court then turned to article II, section 10 in addressing
whether there was a reasonable expectation of privacy in property located outside of the curtilage.96 It observed that because the state constitution used the term “homes”—not, as in the Fourth Amendment,
“houses”—the state constitution might offer a broader scope of protec-
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90. Cordova, 109 N.M. at 216, 784 P.2d at 35. The court held that an affidavit
stating that a confidential informant had provided an officer with information in the
past that the officer had found to be “true and correct from personal observation and
investigation,” did meet the second prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test. However, the
confidential informant telling the officer that the defendant had brought heroin into
town and was selling it at his house and that heroin users had been at the house did
not meet the second prong, as the affidavit did not state the basis of those conclusions.
Id. at 36–37.
91. 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 20, 932 P.2d 1, 7 (citing Cordova, 109 N.M. 211, 784 P.2d
30).
92. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 20, 932 P.2d at 7 (citing State v. Sutton, 112 N.M.
449, 816 P.2d 518 (Ct. App. 1991)).
93. Sutton, 112 N.M. at 450–51, 816 P.2d at 519–20.
94. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S.
170 (1984); Hester v. United States, 267 U.S. 57 (1924). (The open fields doctrine provides that open areas outside the area immediately surrounding a home are not protected by the Fourth Amendment.)
95. Sutton, 112 N.M. at 451–54, 816 P.2d at 520–23. The “curtilage” is the yard or
land surrounding a house, usually enclosed by a fence or wall. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 441 (9th ed. 2009).
96. Id. at 454, 816 P.2d at 523.
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tion.97 Sutton ruled, however, that it was unnecessary to define the scope
of the privacy interest protected by the state constitution, as the defendant had done nothing to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy,
such as posting signs on the land or erecting substantial fences around the
plots.98
Gomez cited State v. Gutierrez99 as an example of the flawed federal
analysis rationale.100 In Gutierrez, the New Mexico Supreme Court ruled
that the state constitution does not permit a federally recognized “good
faith” exception101 to the exclusionary rule developed by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Leon.102 The district court judge in Gutierrez had authorized officers to execute a search warrant by entering the
defendant’s home without knocking.103 The New Mexico Supreme Court
held that exigent circumstances to justify such an entry did not exist, so
the search was invalid.104 The state argued that, since the judge condoned
the unannounced entry, the federal good faith exception should apply.105
The Gutierrez court held that the Leon analysis was flawed.106 It first
discussed three rationales for the state-recognized exclusionary rule: (1)
judicial integrity is compromised if the judiciary allows illegally obtained
evidence to enter courts;107 (2) excluding illegally obtained evidence deters illegal police activity;108 and (3) the exclusionary rule is intended “to
effectuate in the pending case the constitutional right of the accused to be
free from unreasonable search and seizure.”109 The court continued,
“[d]enying the government the fruits of unconstitutional conduct at trial
best effectuates the constitutional proscription of unreasonable searches
and seizures by preserving the rights of the accused to the same extent as
if the government’s officers had stayed within the law.”110 The Gutierrez

02/11/2014 12:56:22

C M
Y K

33613-nmx_43-2 Sheet No. 51 Side A

97. Id. at 455, 816 P.2d at 524.
98. Id.
99. 116 N.M. 431, 863 P.2d 1052 (1993); see, e.g., Shannon Oliver, Note, Refusing
to “Turn the Other Cheek”–New Mexico Rejects Federal “Good Faith” Exception to
the Exclusionary Rule: State v. Gutierrez, 24 N.M. L. REV. 545 (1994).
100. State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 20, 932 P.2d 1, 7.
101. That exception states that when the police act in good faith in obtaining a
search warrant, any evidence discovered by the search will be allowed at trial even if
the warrant is later invalidated. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920 (1984).
102. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. at 447, 863 P.2d at 1068 (discussing Leon, 468 U.S. 897).
103. Id. at 432, 863 P.2d at 1053.
104. Id. at 434, 863 P.2d at 1056.
105. Id. at 433, 863 P.2d at 1055.
106. Id. at 437–38, 863 P.2d at 1058–59.
107. Id. at 446, 863 P.2d at 1066.
108. Id. at 447, 863 P.2d at 1058.
109. Id. at 446, 863 P.2d at 1067.
110. Id.
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court viewed the Leon analysis as flawed because the Leon court examined only the “deterrence of the police” rationale, and not the judicial
integrity or constitutional right rationales.111 Gutierrez based its decision
on the third rationale, that the exclusionary rule preserves the right of the
accused to be free from unreasonable search and seizure regardless of
whether a police officer or a magistrate caused the constitution to be violated.112 The court, declining to follow the federal good faith exception,
held that the evidence should be suppressed.113
Although not cited in Gomez, State v. Wright114 offers another instructional view of the flawed federal analysis rationale. In Wright, the
New Mexico Court of Appeals rejected the federal “apparent authority”
theory of consent to search advanced by the U.S. Supreme Court in Illinois v. Rodriguez.115 In Rodriguez, the defendant’s girlfriend, who did not
have actual authority to consent to a search of the defendant’s apartment,
allowed the police to search.116 The court held that the fruits of the search
should be allowed as evidence because the police had a reasonable belief
that the girlfriend had actual authority. In its discussion of Rodriguez, the
Wright court held that the same reason for rejecting the good faith exception, i.e., protecting individuals’ constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, supported the rejection of an apparent
authority exception to the warrant requirement.117 Consequently, there is
no apparent authority rule under article II, section 10.
The Gomez court cited Campos v. State118 as a second example of
the flawed federal analysis rationale.119 In Campos, the court held that
article II, section 10 requires probable cause and exigent circumstances
for a warrantless felony arrest. This holding diverged from the relevant
U.S. Supreme Court rule, which provides that a public felony arrest may
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111. Id. at 437–38, 863 P.2d at 1058–59. Leon held that misconduct would not be
deterred by applying the exclusionary rule to situations in which police are acting in
good faith in obtaining a warrant. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919–20.
112. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. at 446–47, 863 P.2d at 1067–68.
113. Id. at 447, 863 P.2d at 1068.
114. 119 N.M. 559, 893 P.2d 455 (Ct.App. 1995); see, e.g., Kathleen M. Wilson,
Note, State Constitutional Law–New Mexico Rejects Apparent Authority to Consent as
A Valid Basis for Warrantless Searches: State v. Wright, 26 N.M. L. REV. 571 (1996).
115. Wright, 119 N.M. 559, 893 P.2d 455 (discussing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S.
177 (1990)).
116. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 179.
117. Wright, 119 N.M. at 564–65, 893 P.2d at 460–61.
118. 117 N.M. 155, 870 P.2d 117 (1994); see, e.g., Wendy F. Jones, Note, State Constitutional Law—New Mexico Requires Exigent Circumstances for Warrantless Public
Arrests: Campos v. State, 25 N.M. L. REV. 315 (1995).
119. State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶¶ 19–20, 932 P.2d 1, 7 (citing Campos, 117
N.M. 155, 870 P.2d 117).
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be made without a warrant, regardless of whether any exigency exists.120
The Campos court did not evaluate the federal analysis; rather, it simply
stated that New Mexico courts had expressed a strong preference for
warrants:
[O]ur constitution and case law lead us to hold that for a warrantless arrest to be reasonable the arresting officer must show that
the officer had probable cause to believe the person arrested had
committed or was about to commit a felony and some exigency
existed that precluded the officer from securing a warrant. If an
officer observes the person arrested commit a felony, exigency
will be presumed.121

The Gomez court cited only one case, State v. Attaway, as an example of the “undeveloped federal analogs” rationale.122 In Attaway, the
New Mexico Supreme Court held that article II, section 10 requires that,
absent exigent circumstances, an officer must knock, announce identity
and purpose, and wait a reasonable period of time before entering a residence to execute a warrant.123 Attaway predated the U.S. Supreme
Court’s holding that the Fourth Amendment presumes a “knock and announce” requirement.124
V. POST-GOMEZ CASES
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120. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); United States v. Watson, 423
U.S. 411 (1976).
121. State v. Attaway, 117 N.M. 141, 159, 870 P.2d 103, 121 (1994).
122. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 20, 932 P.2d at 7 (citing Attaway, 117 N.M. 141,
870 P.2d 103).
123. Both an arrest and a search warrant were being executed in Attaway. 117
N.M. at 143, 870 P.2d at 105.
124. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995).
125. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 19, 932 P.2d at 7 (citing Colloquium, supra note
64, at 1358).
126. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 20, 932 P.2d at 7.
127. Id.
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In interpreting article II, section 10, Gomez developed three rationales to justify departing from federal courts’ interpretations of the
Fourth Amendment. One rationale, “structural differences between federal and state government,”125 has not been used explicitly in a search and
seizure case. The remaining two, flawed federal analysis126 and distinctive
state characteristics,127 are often used in tandem. That is, the reason for
additional protection of privacy rights based on the distinctive state characteristics of New Mexico’s constitution and constitutional history is a
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court’s conclusion that the federal rule is based on a flawed analysis of
the Fourth Amendment. Thus, flawed federal analysis, whether explicitly
referred to or not, is almost always the starting point when the courts
have cited distinctive state characteristics. Cases in which the New Mexico courts have not stated a reason for departure from federal precedent
generally contain an implicit criticism of federal precedent.
A. “Seizure” of a person: When does it occur?

C M
Y K
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128. 2009-NMSC-046, 217 P.3d 1032.
129. Id. ¶ 26, 217 P.3d at 1040 (discussing California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621
(1991)).
130. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 1550–51 (emphasis in original).
131. Garcia, 2009-NMSC-046, ¶ 2, 217 P.3d at 1035.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. ¶¶ 4–5, 217 P.3d at 1035.
135. Id. ¶¶ 5–6, 217 P.3d at 1035.
136. Id. ¶ 25, 217 P.3d at 1040.
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State v. Garcia128 examined whether the New Mexico Constitution
defines the seizure of a person in the same way as the U.S. Constitution
does under California v. Hodari D.129 In Hodari D., the U.S. Supreme
Court held that a person who was attempting to elude police was not
seized for purposes of Fourth Amendment protections until there is either “a laying on of hands or application of physical force to restrain
movement . . . or, where that is absent, submission to the assertion of
authority.”130
The defendant in Garcia was observed by a police officer walking
across the street near the address to which the officer had been dispatched regarding a possible incident of domestic violence.131 Without any
basis to believe that the defendant was involved in the incident, the officer stopped his patrol car and spotlighted the defendant.132 He ordered
the defendant to stop several times, as the defendant continued walking
and “fumbling in his pockets.”133 Fearing the defendant was about to run
and that he might have a weapon in his pocket, the officer sprayed the
defendant with pepper spray and then tackled him.134 After the pepper
spray and before the tackling, an item fell to the ground that turned out
to be crack cocaine.135
The New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that “there is serious
uncertainty regarding whether the United States Supreme Court would
suppress the evidence in this case under the Fourth Amendment’s protections against unreasonable searches and seizures.”136 This uncertainty
concerned whether the seizure of the defendant by spraying him with
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pepper spray “ended the moment the officer stopped spraying him with
mace”137 and whether the seizure of the crack was a fruit of an illegal
seizure and thus subject to the exclusionary rule.138
The Garcia court looked to article II, section 10 for a resolution. The
defendant asked the court to depart from Hodari D., arguing that the
reasoning in that ruling was flawed.139 The court declined and instead
turned to what it called the “distinctive New Mexico characteristics”
rationale.140
The court began by outlining three purposes served by article II,
section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution: “It is the foundation of both
personal privacy and the integrity of the criminal justice system, as well as
the ultimate regulator of police conduct.”141 It concluded that regulating
police conduct was the most important concern in the case.142 The court
noted that the Hodari D. ruling focused on the suspect’s reaction, rather
than the officer’s conduct,143 providing that a suspect who submits to an
officer’s authority is deemed to be seized at that time, but a suspect who
does not submit is not seized until there is an application of force upon
the suspect.144 The court then noted that numerous other states have refused to follow Hodari D., highlighting many of the criticisms of Hodari
D. by state appellate courts: “seriously flawed,”145 “unprincipled, a departure from Supreme Court precedent, and unwise policy,”146 “part of a
trend which has left the Fourth Amendment ‘atrophied to the condition
of a vestigial organ,”147 and “the latest manifestation of the Court’s surreal and Orwellian view of personal security in contemporary
America.”148 Garcia concluded that “Hodari D.’s modification of the reasonable person standard weakens the right to be secure from unreasona-
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137. Id. ¶ 22, 217 P.3d at 1039.
138. Id.
139. Id. ¶ 27, 217 P.3d at 1040.
140. Id.
141. Id. ¶ 31, 217 P.3d at 1041.
142. Id.
143. Id. ¶ 32, 217 P.3d at 1041.
144. Id.
145. Id. ¶ 33, 217 P.3d at 1042 (citing California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 637
(1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
146. Id.
147. Id. (quoting State v. Quino, 840 P.2d 358, 365 (1992) (Levinson, J.,
concurring)).
148. Id. (quoting Ronald J. Bacigal, The Right of the People to be Secure, 82 KY.
L.J. 145, 146 (1994)).
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ble searches and seizures beyond a point which may be countenanced
under our state constitution.”149
The distinctive New Mexico characteristic is not clearly identified by
the court, but it appears to be that “the robust character and honored
history of [article II, section 10] with special attention to its purpose of
police regulation.”150 The court established the standard under article II,
section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution as whether, “in view of all the
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have
believed that he was not free to leave.”151 Applying that test to the facts at
hand, the court concluded that the defendant was in custody when the
officer first ordered him to stop.152 As the officer lacked any reasonable
suspicion to place the defendant into investigative detention, the seizure
of the crack cocaine was a fruit of the poisonous tree.153 Garcia serves as
an example of the New Mexico Supreme Court using distinctive state
characteristics as the stated reason for departing from federal precedent
but starting the analysis by criticizing the applicable federal precedent.
B. Pretextual Stops: Rejected on State Constitutional Grounds
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149. Id. ¶ 34, 217 P.3d at 1042.
150. Id. ¶ 31, 217 P.3d at 1041.
151. Id. ¶ 37, 217 P.3d at 1042 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,
554 (1980)).
152. Id. ¶ 41, 217 P.3d at 1043.
153. Id. ¶ 47, 217 P.3d at 1044.
154. David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and all other Traffic Offenses: The
Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544
(1997).
155. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
156. 2009-NMCA-002, 206 P.3d 143.
157. Id. ¶ 20, 206 P.3d at 151.
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A “pretextual stop” is a traffic stop or other type of investigative
detention in which a reasonable officer would not have made the stop for
the reason articulated by the detaining officer.154 A pretextual stop occurs, for example, when an officer who suspects—but lacks reasonable
suspicion—that a driver is guilty of drug possession stops the driver for a
minor traffic violation. In Whren v. United States,155 the U.S. Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of pretextual traffic stops. In contrast,
the New Mexico Court of Appeals in State v. Ochoa156 held that pretextual stops violate article II, section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution.
The Ochoa court impliedly used the flawed federal analysis rationale but
cited distinctive state characteristics as the basis for the departure from
Whren.157
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In Whren, two plainclothes detectives in an unmarked car stopped a
driver for turning without signaling and driving off at an unreasonable
speed.158 When one of the officers approached the car, he saw the passenger holding what looked like two bags of crack cocaine. The officer found
more drugs in the car in a subsequent search.159 The court commented
that a pretextual analysis in the context of a traffic stop is inappropriate
since the probable cause requirement for a traffic stop provides adequate
Fourth Amendment protection.160
In Ochoa, the New Mexico Court of Appeals addressed the question
of whether pretextual stops violate article II, section 10.161 There, a narcotics detective saw the defendant’s car parked in front of a residence
under surveillance.162 When the defendant drove away, the detective
radioed for a patrol officer to stop the car because the defendant was not
wearing a seatbelt.163 After stopping the car, the officer arrested the defendant, who had outstanding arrest warrants.164 The defendant consented
to a search, and the officer found methamphetamine and a pipe.165
The court did not explicitly use the flawed federal analysis rationale,
but it did point out that Whren “suffered widespread criticism of its legal
reasoning, policy choices, and consequences.”166 The court highlighted the
main criticism of Whren: that virtually every driver commits some violation of the traffic laws,167 which gives police “unbridled” discretion.168 The
court concluded:
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158. Whren, 517 U.S. at 808.
159. Id. at 808–09.
160. Id. at 818. The court’s use of the term “probable cause” is problematic in light
of its previous ruling in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979), that reasonable
suspicion is the proper test to evaluate the constitutionality of traffic stops.
161. 2009-NMCA-002, ¶ 20, 206 P.3d at 151.
162. Id. ¶ 2, 206 P.3d at 147.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. ¶ 3, 206 P.3d at 147.
166. Id. ¶ 13, 206 P.3d at 148.
167. Id. ¶ 17, 206 P.3d at 150.
168. Id.
169. Id. ¶ 18, 206 P.3d at 150.
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[W]e are not persuaded, as the Whren court was, that probable
cause and reasonable suspicion standards are sufficient to limit
police discretion to enforcement of traffic offenses . . . . The extensive regulation of all manner of driving subjects virtually all
drivers to the whim of officers who choose to selectively enforce
the traffic code for improper purposes.169
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The court also alluded to the distinctive state characteristics rationale by mentioning a line of New Mexico cases eschewing bright-line
rules. It continued, “Whren ‘established a bright-line rule that any technical violation of a traffic code legitimizes a stop, even if the stop is merely
pretext for an investigation of some other crime.’”170
Holding that that the New Mexico Constitution prohibits pretextual
stops, the court established guidelines to determine if a stop is pretextual.
One consideration is “the objective reasonableness of an officer’s actions
and the subjective intent of the officer—the real reason for the stop.”171
The court found the traffic stop unconstitutional.
The New Mexico Supreme Court has had two opportunities to either uphold or overrule the court of appeals’ holding in Ochoa. It first
granted and then quashed certiorari in Ochoa.172 Then, in State v. Gonzales,173 the court remanded the case to the district court for a factual determination that avoided addressing the ruling in Ochoa. In Gonzales, a
detective working on a tip that the driver was transporting drugs told a
patrol officer to stop the car for a window tinting violation. The detective
admitted that the traffic stop was a pretext for the drug investigation.174
The supreme court remanded the case to the district court to determine
whether the detective had reasonable suspicion to place the defendant
into investigative detention for a drug investigation.175 The New Mexico
Supreme Court thus left standing the court of appeals’ use in Ochoa of an
explicit citation to distinctive state characteristics as the basis for departure from federal precedent while devoting substantially more analysis to
criticizing the federal precedent.
C. Questioning Drivers: Greater Protections under Article II, Section 10
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170. Id. ¶ 25, 206 P.3d at 152 (quoting United States v. Mosley, 454 F.3d 249, 253
(3d Cir. 2006)).
171. Id. ¶ 39, 206 P.3d at 155.
172. State v. Ochoa, 2009-NMCA-002, 206 P.3d 143.
173. 2011-NMSC-012, 257 P.3d 894.
174. Id. ¶ 6, 257 P.3d at 896.
175. Id. ¶¶ 16–17, 257 P.3d at 898–99.
176. 1998-NMCA-029, ¶ 18, 954 P.2d 93, 98, overruled by State v. Leyva, 2011NMSC-009, 250 P.3d 861.
177. 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009).
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In a line of cases beginning with Albuquerque v. Haywood,176 the
New Mexico appellate courts had held that the Fourth Amendment prohibited officers from asking questions unrelated to the initial purpose of
the stop unless there was reasonable suspicion to support the questioning.
But in the 2009 case Arizona v. Johnson,177 the U.S. Supreme Court held
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that officers may ask questions unrelated to the reason for a traffic stop
as long as the questioning did not prolong the length of the detention.
Johnson forced New Mexico courts to reconsider their Fourth Amendment analysis. In State v. Leyba,178 the New Mexico Supreme Court held
that the rule limiting questioning on topics not related to the initial purpose of the investigative detention was grounded in article II, section 10.
1. Fourth Amendment analysis of the rules concerning questioning of
drivers
In Haywood,179 the city of Albuquerque had attempted to confiscate
$28,000 in cash and a handgun uncovered in a traffic stop.180 An officer
stopped the defendant for not having a visible license plate or tag.181 After getting the defendant’s license and registration,182 the officer asked the
defendant if he had any guns or knives in the car.183 The defendant answered that there was a handgun under the seat.184 The officer asked the
defendant to exit the car, and, collecting the gun, saw a ski mask, shotgun
shells, and binoculars.185 A second officer then searched the vehicle and
found a white plastic bag containing cash.186 Finding no evidence of any
criminal activity, the officers released the defendant but retained the cash
and the gun.187
With little discussion, the court of appeals held that the first officer
did not have reasonable suspicion to ask the defendant if he had any guns
or knives in the vehicle.188 Therefore, the ultimate recovery of the gun and
the cash were fruits of illegal questioning.189
The following year, in State v. Taylor,190 the court expanded the Haywood ruling to questions about drugs. In Taylor, two officers stopped the
defendant in response to a report that he and a passenger were throwing
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178. 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 63, 250 P.3d 861, 880.
179. 1998-NMCA-029, 954 P.2d 93.
180. Id. ¶ 8, 954 P.2d at 96.
181. Id. ¶ 3, 954 P.2d at 95.
182. The New Mexico Supreme Court had previously ruled that such paperwork
may always be requested during a traffic stop, regardless of the purpose of the stop.
State. v. Reynolds, 119 N.M. 383, 890 P.2d 1315 (1995).
183. Haywood, 1998-NMCA-029, ¶ 5, 954 P.2d at 95.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. ¶ 6, 954 P.2d at 95.
187. Id. ¶ 8, 954 P.2d at 96.
188. Id. ¶ 16, 954 P.2d at 97.
189. Id. ¶ 18, 954 P.2d at 98.
190. 1999-NMCA-022, 973 P.2d 246.

33613-nmx_43-2 Sheet No. 55 Side B

02/11/2014 12:56:22

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\43-2\NMX205.txt

462

unknown

Seq: 22

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

31-JAN-14

14:16

[Vol. 43

trash from the window of their car, which was parked in a dirt lot.191 Both
suspects denied littering.192 As one officer checked the suspects’ identification for wants and warrants, the second officer asked the suspects if
they had any guns, alcohol, or illegal drugs in the car.193 They denied having any.194 The officer asked if he could search the car.195 The defendant
consented, and the officer found crack cocaine.196
Citing Haywood, the court of appeals held that the officer “was not
entitled to ask about illegal drugs and alcohol because drugs and alcohol
were unrelated to the purpose of the investigatory stop, which was to
investigate allegations of littering and a larceny that had occurred about
six months earlier.”197 Like Haywood, Taylor was based on an interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, not article II, section 10.
In State v. Duran, the New Mexico Supreme Court first addressed
the issue of whether an officer may ask questions unrelated to the initial
purpose of the stop without first developing reasonable suspicion related
to those questions.198 An officer stopped the defendant to determine if the
improperly placed tag in the rear window of her vehicle was a valid temporary registration.199 When the officer asked the defendant for her license, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance, he noticed a floor jack,
loose tools, and the odor of gasoline.200 The defendant had just purchased
the car, and there were irregularities in her paperwork.201 The officer
asked the defendant about her travel plans.202 She answered that she and
her passenger were traveling from Silver City to Las Cruces, a route that,
if followed directly, would not have put them on the road where they
were stopped.203 When the officer asked the passenger about their travel
plans, she replied that they were traveling from Las Cruces to Albuquer-
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191. Id. ¶ 2, 973 P.2d at 248.
192. Id. ¶ 3, 973 P.2d at 248.
193. Id. ¶ 4, 973 P.2d at 249.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. ¶ 20, 973 P.2d at 252.
198. 2005-NMSC-034, 120 P.3d. 836, overruled by State v. Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009,
250 P.3d 861.
199. Id. ¶ 3, 120 P.3d at 839.
200. Id. ¶ 4, 120 P.3d at 839.
201. Id. ¶ 7, 120 P.3d at 839. The bill of sale was hand-written even though it listed
a dealer as the seller, the odometer disclosure statement was signed but not completed, and the temporary tag was set to expire in less than one month from the date
of sale, which was unusual. Id.
202. Id. ¶ 8, 120 P.3d at 840.
203. Id.
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¶ 13, 120 P.3d at 840.
¶ 12, 120 P.3d at 840.
¶¶ 14–15, 120 P.3d at 840–41.
¶ 15, 120 P.3d at 841.
¶ 16, 120 P.3d at 841.
¶¶ 31–32, 120 P.3d at 841.
¶ 34, 120 P.3d at 845.
¶ 42, 120 P.3d at 848.
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que, another route that did not directly coincide with the road on which
they were traveling.204
The officer observed not only a number of other inconsistencies in
the defendant’s answers, but also her extreme nervousness while giving
those answers.205 The officer issued a citation for the improper tag location and then asked the defendant if she had any drugs or weapons in the
car.206 She denied having any. The defendant and her passenger then consented in writing to a vehicle search.207 With the help of a Border Patrol
officer using a fiber optic scope, the officer found a large amount of marijuana in the gas tank.208
The court reviewed the case under only a Fourth Amendment analysis. The court noted the split of authority in cases dealing with questioning about unrelated topics: Some courts permitted the questioning if it
does not increase the length of the stop; others required that questioning
be reasonably related to the initial purpose of the stop.209 The court elaborated that, among the latter group of cases, some embraced a bright-line
rule allowing questions about travel plans, which courts considered related to the initial purpose of a traffic stop, while other courts evaluated
the question case by case.210
The Duran court sided with the line of authority that evaluated caseby-case whether travel plans are a permissible topic of questioning, permitting it if they are reasonably related to the initial purpose of the
stop.211 The court decided that the officers’ questions about travel plans
were related to the initial purpose of the stop, an improperly displayed
tag. The court determined that, while the officer did not have reasonable
suspicion of drug activity at that time, there was a connection between
the travel plans and the concerns about the paperwork.212
The court then examined whether the officer’s questions about
drugs and request for consent to search the vehicle were permissible. The
court quoted Taylor for the proposition that “an officer may expand the
scope of the search or seizure during the investigatory stop only where
the officer has reasonable and articulable suspicion that other criminal
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activity has been or may be afoot.”213 The court distinguished the case’s
facts from those of Haywood and Taylor and established that the officer
in Duran had reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of questioning to
drugs.214 Therefore, the officer’s question about drugs and request for
consent to search were proper.215 This opinion was based on the Fourth
Amendment and did not examine article II, section 10.
Two later New Mexico Supreme Court cases also used a Fourth
Amendment analysis to evaluate the propriety of an officer’s asking
about drugs during a traffic stop. The facts in State v. Van Dang216 resembled those in Duran.217 In Van Dang, the defendant was driving a rental
car when he was stopped for speeding.218 The rental contract did not authorize the defendant to drive the car, a fact that made the officer suspicious.219 The defendant said that his uncle had rented the car and allowed
him to drive it.220 The officer requested that dispatch try to determine
through the rental company if the car was stolen.221 In the meantime, he
asked the defendant and his passenger about their travel plans; they gave
inconsistent answers.222 After waiting twenty-five minutes to hear from
the rental car company, the officer asked the two if they had any drugs in
the vehicle, which they denied.223 At the officer’s request, the two consented to a vehicle search.224 The officer found approximately 20,000 Ecstasy pills in the trunk.225 The court determined that the officer had
developed reasonable suspicion to ask the drug-related questions.226
In State v. Funderburg,227 the court addressed the issue of whether
finding drugs on a passenger gives police reasonable suspicion to question
the driver of the vehicle. The officer stopped the defendant because his
car matched the description of one that, a few hours before, had been
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213. Id. ¶ 23, 120 P.3d at 843 (quoting State v. Taylor, 1999-NMCA-022, ¶ 20, 973
P.2d 246, 252).
214. Id. ¶ 41, 120 P.3d at 847–48.
215. Id. ¶ 42, 120 P.3d at 843.
216. 2005-NMSC-033, 120 P.3d 830.
217. State v. Duran, 2005-NMSC-034, 120 P.3d. 836, overruled by State v. Leyva,
2011-NMSC-009, 250 P.3d 861.
218. 2005-NMSC-033, ¶ 1, 120 P.3d 830, 832.
219. Id.
220. Id. ¶ 2, 120 P.3d at 832.
221. Id. ¶ 1, 120 P.3d at 832.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. ¶ 16, 120 P.3d at 836.
227. 2008-NMSC-026, 183 P.3d 922.
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connected to the passing of a forged check.228 The officer ordered one of
the two passengers, the alleged forger, out of the vehicle.229 The passenger
seemed nervous and repeatedly put his hand into his pocket.230 The officer asked what was in his pocket, and he admitted that he had a marijuana pipe, which the officer recovered.231 After arresting the passenger,
the officer returned to the car and asked the driver whether there was
anything in the car that he should know about.232 The defendant said that
there was not, and the officer asked for and received consent to search.233
The officer found a pipe and methamphetamine.234 The court held that
the officer had reasonable suspicion to ask about the contents of the car
and for consent to search.235
2. Article II, section 10 analysis of the rules concerning questioning
of drivers
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Id. ¶ 2, 183 P.3d at 924.
Id. ¶ 4, 183 P.3d at 925.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 5, 183 P.3d at 925.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 33, 183 P.3d at 931.
555 U.S. 323 (2009).
Id. at 327.
Id. at 328.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 326.
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In 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court in Arizona v. Johnson236 resolved
the circuit split on whether reasonable suspicion is required for the police
to ask questions unrelated to the initial purpose of the stop. The Supreme
Court answered in the negative; thereafter, the New Mexico Supreme
Court turned to the New Mexico Constitution to address the issue.
In Johnson, the defendant was a passenger in a car stopped because
its registration had been suspended for an insurance violation.237 The officer suspected, based on his observations of clothing and behavior, that
the passenger was a gang member.238 During questioning, the officer
learned that the passenger was a convicted felon.239 The officer asked him
to get out of the car, conducted a pat-down search, and found a concealed
gun.240
The court noted that, when the police stop a vehicle, the passenger
is in detention.241 However, the court held that the questioning related to
gang affiliation was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment: “An of-
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242. Id. at 333.
243. 2011-NMSC-009, 250 P.3d 861.
244. Id. ¶ 4, 250 P.3d at 864.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. ¶ 6, 250 P.3d at 864–65.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. ¶ 10, 250 P.3d at 866.
251. Id. ¶ 51, 250 P.3d at 877 (quoting State v. Cardenez-Alverez, 2001-NMSC-017,
¶ 15, 25 P.3d 225, 231).
252. Id. ¶¶ 54–56, 250 P.3d at 878–79.
253. Id. ¶ 53, 250 P.3d at 878.
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ficer’s inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic
stop, this Court has made plain, do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.”242
Johnson rendered invalid the New Mexico line of cases that relied
on the Fourth Amendment to require reasonable suspicion for such additional questioning. In State v. Leyba, the New Mexico Supreme Court
reevaluated the issue by analyzing it under article II, section 10.243
The Leyba defendant was a driver who was stopped for speeding.244
Before the defendant came to a full stop, the officer saw him lean over as
if to hide something under the passenger seat.245 The officer determined
that the defendant’s license was suspended.246 After issuing three traffic
citations, the officer asked if the vehicle contained any “knives, needles,
guns, or drugs.”247 The defendant admitted there was marijuana in the
car.248 The officer received consent to search and found not only marijuana, but also methamphetamine.249
The Leyba court first applied Johnson and concluded that the officer’s question about the vehicle’s contents did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.250 The court went on to evaluate whether the question violated article II, section 10. The court cited the “[t]he extra layer of protection from unreasonable searches and seizures” as a “distinct state
characteristic of New Mexico constitutional law”251 in holding that the
New Mexico Constitution should be interpreted differently from the federal Constitution. However, the court included a lengthy critique of Johnson and other federal precedents that established “bright-line rules”
rather than using a “fact-based, case-by-case approach. . . .”252 The court
noted that article II, section 10 is “calibrated slightly differently than the
Fourth Amendment.”253 The court continued, “New Mexico courts have
consistently rejected bright-line rules in favor of an examination into the
reasonableness of officers’ actions under the circumstances of each
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case.”254 Requiring reasonable suspicion for questions unrelated to the initial purpose of the traffic stop “ensures that investigating officers do not
engage in ‘fishing expeditions’ during traffic stops.”255
The court went on to note that the U.S. Supreme Court’s bright-line
rule “has come under criticism from scholars and courts alike.”256 The
court quoted Professor Wayne R. LaFave:
[The rule] amount[s] to nothing more than an encouragement of
police to engage in pretextual traffic stops so that they may engage in interrogation about drugs in a custodial setting. . . . The
correct rule is that followed by some other courts: that in strict
accordance with Terry and its progeny, questioning during a traffic stop must be limited to the purpose of a traffic stop and thus
may not be extended to the subject of drugs.257

Ultimately, however, the court ruled in favor of the state. It based
its ruling on the officer’s observation of the defendant’s “furtive movement—appearing to hide something under the passenger seat—before
stopping.”258 This gave the officer reasonable suspicion to ask about the
“presence of weapons or other contraband in the vehicle.”259 Leyba serves
as another example of the court explicitly citing distinctive state characteristics as the basis for the ruling, but flawed federal analysis is strongly
implied as a basis in the lengthy criticism of federal precedent.
D. Questioning Passengers: Only When Reasonable Suspicion Exists
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254. Id. ¶ 54, 250 P.3d at 878.
255. Id. ¶ 55, 250 P.3d at 878.
256. Id. ¶ 56, 250 P.3d at 879.
257. Id. (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, The “Routine Traffic Stop” From Start to Finish: Too Much “Routine,” Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1843,
1887 (2004)).
258. Id. ¶ 60, 250 P.3d at 880.
259. Id.
260. 2004-NMCA-038, 87 P.3d 1088.
261. 555 U.S. 323 (2009).
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Since State v. Affsprung,260 the New Mexico Court of Appeals has
consistently held that passengers may not be questioned absent individualized reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or dangerousness. The
rule initially was based on a Fourth Amendment analysis. However, as
with questioning of drivers, Arizona v. Johnson261 forced the New Mexico
appellate courts to base the rule on article II, section 10.
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1. Fourth Amendment analysis of rules concerning questioning of
passengers

2004-NMCA-038, ¶ 2, 87 P.3d 1088, 1090.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 16, 87 P.3d at 1094.
Id. ¶ 20, 87 P.3d at 1094.
2006-NMCA-067, 136 P.3d 1022.
Id. ¶ 3, 136 P.3d at 1024.
Id. ¶ 4, 136 P.3d at 1024.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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In Affsprung, an officer asked the defendant, a passenger, for identification.262 The car was stopped for a “faulty license plate light.”263 The
passenger told the officer his name, date of birth, and Social Security
number.264 Based on that information, the officer learned that there was a
warrant for the defendant’s arrest.265 The search incident to arrest revealed methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia in the defendant’s
pockets.266
The New Mexico Court of Appeals first analyzed whether the defendant was in custody. The court concluded that the defendant was in
custody, as “few passengers in this circumstance would, in our view, feel
free to ignore the officer’s request for identification, or feel free to get
out of the vehicle and leave the area after either refusing to give the information or even after providing it.”267 The court added that an officer’s
generalized concern for personal safety does not outweigh a passenger’s
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unwarranted questioning.268
A passenger who owns a vehicle might be required to produce identification. In State v. Rubio,269 the defendant was a passenger in a car
stopped because the driver was not wearing a seatbelt.270 The officer
asked the driver to identify the car’s owner after the driver “had a difficult time presenting the paperwork.”271 The driver pointed to the defendant, who was sitting in the front passenger seat.272 The officer asked the
defendant for identification, which he produced.273 The officer then ran a
check and learned that the defendant had an outstanding arrest warrant.274 The officer searched the car and found marijuana and crack
cocaine.275
The court held that it was reasonable for the officer to ask the owner
to produce identification, as he “was responsible for assuring that the ve-
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hicle was properly registered and insured, and was also responsible for
giving permission to the driver to operate the vehicle.”276 As to the check
for warrants, the court noted that “our case law considers the continuing
intrusion of a computer check relating to license and registration as a de
minimus procedure related to the government’s and the officer’s legitimate interests in making sure that the driver is properly licensed and
driving a vehicle that is properly registered and insured.”277
In State v. Patterson,278 the court of appeals clarified the standard for
questioning passengers and reinforced the need for individualized suspicion. The ruling consolidated two cases involving defendant passengers.279
The Patterson defendant was a passenger in a car parked late at night in a
closed business’s lot.280 An officer approached the car and asked the
driver what they were doing there.281 After seeing an open beer container
in the car, the officer patted down the driver and found a glass pipe.282
The officer asked the defendant for identification.283 The officer recognized the defendant as someone who had been booked a few days earlier.284 He asked the defendant to get out of the car and saw the defendant
pull something out of his pocket: a baggie of methamphetamine.285
The defendant in the other (consolidated) case, State v. Swanson,286
was a passenger in a car that, late at night, pulled into a parking lot in an
apparent attempt to avoid a roadblock.287 The officer pulled up behind
the car and, after telling the three occupants to stay in the car, asked
them why they were avoiding the roadblock.288 One of the passengers said
that the car was overheating.289 All three occupants appeared to be “very
nervous and avoiding eye contact.”290 The officer ordered the occupants
to get out of the car.291 The defendant was asked to empty his pockets.292
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Id. ¶ 18, 136 P.3d at 1027.
Id. ¶ 20, 136 P.3d at 1027.
2006-NMCA-037, 131 P.3d 1286.
Id.
Id. ¶ 2, 131 P.3d at 1288.
Id. ¶ 3, 131 P.3d at 1288.
Id.
Id. ¶ 4, 131 P.3d at 1289.
Id. ¶ 5, 131 P.3d at 1289.
Id. ¶ 6, 131 P.3d at 1289.
Id. ¶ 8, 131 P.3d at 1289.
Id.
Id. ¶ 9, 131 P.3d at 1289.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 10, 131 P.3d at 1289.
Id. ¶ 11, 131 P.3d at 1289.
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He complied and produced drug paraphernalia, marijuana, and
methamphetamine.293
After concluding that both defendants were in investigatory detention, the court examined in each defendant’s case whether the officers
had individualized reasonable suspicion. The court held that neither finding drugs on the driver nor the observation of the open beer container
gave the police individualized reasonable suspicion of the first defendant’s drug possession:294 “Mere presence was not sufficient to create an
individualized suspicion that defendant Patterson was in violation of the
open container law.”295 As to the second defendant, the court ruled that
there were no facts to support a reasonable suspicion of criminal
behavior.296
2. Article II, section 10 analysis of the rules concerning questioning
of passengers
In State v. Portillo,297 the New Mexico Court of Appeals extended
State v. Leyba,298 which used article II, section 10 in limiting the questioning of drivers, to apply to the questioning of passengers. The defendant
was the passenger in a car stopped for speeding.299 The defendant avoided
eye contact with the officer by looking straight ahead while the officer
collected the driver’s paperwork.300 The officer told the driver to go to the
patrol car so the officer could issue a citation.301 In the meantime, a second officer arrived to watch the defendant.302 After issuing the citation,
the first officer told the driver that he was free to leave.303 As the driver
was returning to his car, the officer asked him if he had any drugs or
weapons in the vehicle.304 The driver said he did not and consented to a
vehicle search.305 Before the search, the officer asked the passenger the
33613-nmx_43-2 Sheet No. 59 Side B

Id. ¶¶ 11-12, 131 P.3d at 1289-90.
Id. ¶ 28, 131 P.3d at 1293.
Id.
Id. ¶ 29, 131 P.3d at 1293.
2011-NMCA-079, 256 P.3d 466.
2011-NMSC-009, 250 P.3d 861.
Portillo, 2011-NMCA-079, ¶ 4, 258 P.2d at 468.
Id.
Id. ¶ 5, 131 P.3d at 469.
Id. ¶ 4, 131 P.3d at 468.
Id. ¶ 5, 131 P.3d at 469.
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same question; he, too, said “no” and consented to a vehicle search.306
The officer found illegal drugs.307
The court first determined that the defendant was in detention: The
first officer had told the second officer to watch the defendant while he
was issuing the citation.308 Furthermore, the defendant was not informed
that he was free to leave.309 Because the defendant was in investigative
detention, the court applied the Leyva holding.
The court commented that Leyva departed from the Fourth Amendment analysis, which examined whether the questioning prolonged the
stop.310 The court held that article II, section 10 required reasonable suspicion in order to expand the scope of questioning of passengers.311 Nevertheless, the court did not overrule its previous holdings based on the
Fourth Amendment rule. Ultimately, the court determined that the defendant’s behavior did not give the officer reasonable suspicion of illegal
drug or weapon possession.312 Aside from citing Leyba, the decision in
Portillo provides no rationale for the departure from the federal rule.
E. Vehicle Searches: Reasonableness and Exigent Circumstances
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306. Id. ¶ 6, 131 P.3d at 469.
307. Id. ¶ 7, 131 P.3d at 469.
308. Id. ¶ 11, 131 P.3d at 469.
309. Id. ¶ 17, 131 P.3d at 470.
310. Id. ¶ 21, 131 P.3d at 471.
311. Id. ¶ 22, 131 P.3d at 471-72.
312. Id. ¶ 23, 131 P.3d at 472. While beyond the scope of this article, the court did
go on to hold that the defendant could contest the search of the car as the drugs were
the fruit of the illegal questioning of both the defendant and the driver. This seems
contrary to the principle that a passenger generally does not have standing to contest
an illegal search of a vehicle. See generally Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
313. JACQUELINE R. KANOVITZ & MICHAEL I. KANOVITZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
207 (10th ed. 2005).
314. 1997-NMSC-006, 932 P.2d 1.
315. 1997-NMCA-081, 944 P.2d 276.
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The U.S. Supreme Court has developed several doctrines authorizing police to conduct warrantless vehicle searches, including protective
sweep for weapons; search incident to arrest; probable cause related to a
vehicle containing contraband or evidence of a crime; and inventory
search.313 Here, too, is an area in which the New Mexico appellate courts
have expressed distaste for the U.S. Supreme Court’s bright-line rules,
preferring instead to analyze search and seizure requirements under article II, section 10.
The New Mexico appellate courts’ first opportunity to apply State v.
Gomez314 was in State v. Arredondo,315 which involved a review of almost
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all of the federal doctrines justifying warrantless searches of vehicles. In
Arredondo, the court of appeals held that the U.S. Supreme Court’s
bright-line rule allowing a police officer to search a vehicle’s passenger
compartment upon arrest of an occupant does not apply under article II,
section 10.316 Applying Gomez, the court also rejected the Carroll Doctrine, the Fourth Amendment rule that probable cause of evidence in a
movable vehicle is, per se, an exigent circumstance, regardless of the
facts.317
In Arredondo, an officer had stopped the defendant’s car because of
suspicion that the driver had just assaulted someone with a handgun.318
During a protective sweep of the inside of the car, the officer observed a
small amount of marijuana on the floor.319 After the protective sweep, the
officer spoke briefly with the defendant.320 The officer then conducted a
more thorough search of the car and discovered cocaine in a small hole
that had been cut into the dashboard.321
The court ruled that the first search was a valid protective sweep322
but that the second was invalid.323 The court held that the second search,
based on probable cause, was invalid because there was no showing of
exigent circumstances, as required by Gomez.324 The court explained that
the logic of Gomez also required a rejection of the bright-line rule allowing a complete search of the passenger compartment of a vehicle after
the valid arrest of an occupant.325 The court wrote that New Mexico
courts’ interpretation of article II, section 10 “eschew[s] bright line rules
and instead emphasizes the fact specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry.”326 In Arredondo, no reason for a search incident to arrest, e.g.,
that the arrested defendant could have gotten a weapon, or hidden or
destroyed evidence within his immediate control, was present.327 A pro-
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316. The U.S. Supreme Court has since abandoned the bright-line rule allowing
police to conduct a search incident to arrest of the passenger compartment of a vehicle, regardless of whether that area is truly within the immediate control of the arrestee. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
317. See Carroll v. United States, 276 U.S. 132 (1925).
318. Arredondo, 1997-NMCA-081, ¶ 2, 944 P.2d at 279.
319. Id. ¶ 6, 944 P.2d at 279.
320. Id. ¶ 7, 944 P.2d at 280.
321. Id.
322. Id. ¶ 12, 944 P.2d at 280.
323. Id. ¶ 22, 944 P.2d at 283.
324. Id. ¶ 23, 944 P.2d at 283.
325. Id.
326. Id. ¶ 28, 944 P.2d at 284.
327. Id. ¶ 23, 944 P.2d at 284.
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tective sweep had been conducted and the defendant was “detained
outside the vehicle.”328
Arredondo does not articulate a rationale for departing from the
federal Carroll Doctrine or the federal rule allowing the search of a vehicle as part of a search incident to arrest. The court simply cited Gomez
and its expressed distaste for bright-line rules as adequate justification.329
1. Vehicle Searches Based on Probable Cause
In State v. Warsaw, the New Mexico Court of Appeals again applied
Gomez in the context of a search based on probable cause that evidence
was inside a vehicle.330 Warsaw gave the court an opportunity to emphasize that the Carroll Doctrine331 was not valid under article II, section 10.
In Warsaw, a driver who had been in an accident told a tow-truck
driver that there was a pound of cocaine in his trunk.332 The police were
notified about the defendant’s statement, and brought a drug-sniffing dog
to the impound lot.333 The dog alerted to the presence of drugs and the
trunk was pried and cut open.334 Inside were three-and-a-half pounds of
cocaine.335
The court first determined that the search was valid under the
Fourth Amendment.336 It then determined that the warrantless search was
not conducted under exigent circumstances and therefore was invalid
under article II, section 10.337 Like Arredondo,338 Warsaw does not articulate a rationale for the departure from the Carroll Doctrine but simply
cites to Gomez as justification.339
In State v. Jones, the New Mexico Court of Appeals departed from
the federal rule by holding invalid the warrantless seizure of evidence in
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328. Id. ¶ 29, 944 P.2d at 284. It is not clear whether the defendant was handcuffed,
but “backup” had arrived. Id. ¶ 6, 944 P.2d at 279. The court also rejected the state’s
argument that the evidence would have inevitably been discovered during an inventory search, as there was no showing that the vehicle would have been impounded and
searched pursuant to an established departmental policy. Id. ¶ 29, 944 P.2d at 284.
329. Id. ¶ 28, 944 P.2d at 284.
330. 1998-NMCA-044, ¶ 18, 956 P.2d 139, 143.
331. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
332. Warsaw, 1998-NMCA-044, ¶ 8, 956 P.2d at 142.
333. Id. ¶ 5, 956 P.2d at 141.
334. Id. ¶ 10, 956 P.2d at 142.
335. Id.
336. Id. ¶ 17, 956 P.2d at 143.
337. Id. ¶ 19, 956 P.2d at 143.
338. State v. Arredondo, 1997-NMCA-081, 944 P.2d 276.
339. Warsaw, 1998-NMCA-044, ¶ 18, 956 P.2d 139, 143.
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plain view in a vehicle.340 The Carroll Doctrine341 permits the warrantless
seizure of not only the item in plain view but also other evidence or contraband discovered during a subsequent vehicle search.342
The Jones343 defendant was parked on a public street late at night.344
An officer approached.345 The officer was concerned because there recently had been several burglaries in the area, and he knew the defendant
had been involved with drugs.346 When the defendant responded that he
had stopped to blow his nose, the officer’s concern grew.347 He asked the
defendant if he had any weapons.348 The defendant produced a pocketknife but refused the officer’s request for consent to search the vehicle.349 The officer then went around the vehicle with a flashlight and saw,
in plain view but partially covered by a towel, a hypodermic plunger and
needle.350 He immediately seized the items.351 In moving the towel, he
found a package wrapped in a way he believed was used for drugs, so he
also seized the package, which was later discovered to contain cocaine.352
The court noted that plain view of evidence within a building does
not justify warrantless entry into the building to seize the evidence unless
there are exigent circumstances or another exception to the warrant requirement.353 The court continued:
In Gomez, our Supreme Court . . . extended to persons in automobiles the same search and seizure protections under Article II,
Section 10, of the New Mexico Constitution that apply to dwellings with regard to the exigent circumstances exception to the
warrant requirement. We believe it logically follows that the same
rule that applies to dwellings requiring a warrant prior to a seizure
of evidence seen in plain view from outside the residence would
also apply to automobiles under Article II, Section 10.354
33613-nmx_43-2 Sheet No. 61 Side B

2002-NMCA-019, ¶ 13, 40 P.3d 1030, 1033.
See Carroll v. United States, 276 U.S. 132 (1925).
E.g., Wyoming. v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999).
Jones, 2002-NMCA-019, ¶ 13, 40 P.3d at 1033.
Id. ¶ 2, 40 P.3d at 1031.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3, 40 P.3d at 1031.
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 3–4, 40 P.3d at 1032.
Id. ¶ 5, 40 P.3d at 1032.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 12, 40 P.3d at 1033.
Id. ¶ 14, 40 P.3d at 1033–34.
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State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, 932 P.2d 1.
Jones, 2002-NMCA-019, ¶ 15, 40 P.3d at 1034.
2005-NMSC-017, 116 P.3d 72.
Id. ¶ 2, 116 P.3d at 74.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 4, 116 P.3d at 74.
Id.
Id. ¶ 5, 116 P.3d at 74.
Id. ¶ 29, 116 P.3d at 79.
Id. ¶ 32, 116 P.3d at 80.
2008-NMSC-029, 184 P.3d 1045.
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Because the Jones officer was not faced with exigent circumstances, the
warrantless entry into the car to seize evidence was unconstitutional. The
Jones court did not articulate which rationale justifies departure from the
federal rule allowing warrantless seizure of contraband in plain view in an
automobile. As with previous cases, the court simply relied on Gomez355
to arrive at its holding.356
Initially, in State v. Garcia,357 the New Mexico Supreme Court
agreed with the Jones holding. The Garcia defendant was a passenger in a
vehicle stopped for a license plate violation.358 Before the car came to a
complete stop, the defendant got out and then defied the officer’s order
to get back in.359 The defendant “stared at [the officer] with an aggressive
look described as a ‘thousand yard stare.’”360 After citing the driver, the
officer returned to the vehicle and saw a gun protruding from underneath
the back of the passenger seat.361 He ordered the driver and the defendant to get out of the car, and removed the gun.362 The defendant then
admitted that he was a convicted felon.363
The court examined whether there were exigent circumstances to
justify the warrantless gun seizure. The court wrote that, “even with an
object in plain view, an officer may not enter the car and seize the object,
without either consent, a warrant, or exigent circumstances.”364 Nevertheless, the court found the seizure to be a valid protective sweep. The court
held that “[t]he officers searched the car and seized the gun, not as evidence of a crime, but in a reasonable effort to secure the scene.”365 As
with the previous court of appeals cases holding that evidence in plain
view in a vehicle may not be seized in the absence of a warrant or exigent
circumstances, Garcia did not articulate a rationale for departure from
the federal rule.
In State v. Bomboy,366 the New Mexico Supreme Court overruled
Jones and Garcia. In Bomboy, the court was less eager than the court of
appeals in Jones to reject entirely the Carroll Doctrine, and it authorized
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367. Id. ¶ 18, 184 P.3d at 1049.
368. The only traffic offense the defendant was charged with was having a defective license plate lamp. Id. ¶ 1, 184 P.3d at 1046.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id. ¶ 12, 184 P.3d at 1048.
372. Id. ¶ 11, 184 P.3d at 1048.
373. Id. ¶ 8, 184 P.3d at 1047.
374. Id. ¶ 10, 184 P.3d at 1047–48; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
375. Bomboy, 2008-NMSC-029, ¶ 10, 184 P.3d at 1047–48.
376. Id.
377. Id. ¶ 12, 184 P.3d at 1048.
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the warrantless seizure of items in plain view, though not the entire
vehicle.367
In Bomboy, the defendant was a driver who was stopped for a traffic
offense.368 The officer saw plastic baggies, which appeared to contain
methamphetamine, between the car’s seats.369 The officer arrested the defendant and seized the baggies, which, it was later shown, contained
methamphetamine.370
The New Mexico Supreme Court rejected the Jones court’s equation
of the privacy expectation in an automobile to the privacy expectation in
a residence.371 The court noted that there is “a heightened expectation of
privacy in one’s home.”372 It also noted that the Gomez court did not
determine whether, absent exigent circumstances, the warrantless seizure
of items in plain view would have been valid under the New Mexico
Constitution.373
The Bomboy court referred to the two-part test that Justice Harlan
discussed in his concurring opinion in Katz v. United States,374 which determines whether an expectation of privacy is reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment.375 In the first prong, a court asks whether the individual has a subjective expectation of privacy. In the second prong, a
court asks whether society would recognize that expectation as
reasonable.
The court concluded: “[e]ven if Defendant did expect privacy in this
area, society would not recognize such an expectation as reasonable given
its conspicuous nature. Therefore, [the officer] reaching into the car is not
considered an infringement on a legitimate expectation of privacy.”376 The
court characterized as dictum its statement in Garcia that plain view does
not justify warrantless entry into a vehicle.377 The court did not address
whether, as accepted under the Carroll Doctrine, the police may conduct
a warrantless search of the entire vehicle after discovering evidence in
plain view.
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2. Vehicle Searches Based on Search Incident to Arrest
Under Arizona v. Gant,378 the federal rule permits officers to search
the passenger compartment of a car as a search incident to arrest, regardless of whether the passenger compartment is actually within an arrestee’s reach.379 In a line of cases consistent with Gomez’s380 rejection of a
bright-line search and seizure rule, New Mexico appellate courts have required that, for a passenger compartment area to be searchable, it must
be within the immediate control of the arrestee.
The court of appeals first rejected the federal rule in State v. Arredondo381 and then in State v. Gutierrez382 and State v. Pittman.383 In State
v. Rowell,384 the New Mexico Supreme Court placed its imprimatur on the
rule that the New Mexico Constitution allows a search incident to arrest
only when the vehicle is within the immediate control of the arrestee. The
court of appeals based its departure from the federal rule on the distinctive state characteristics rationale, commenting that “[t]he extra layer of
protection from unreasonable searches and seizures involving automobiles is a distinct characteristic of New Mexico constitutional law.”385 The
New Mexico Supreme Court, however, used the flawed federal analysis
rationale.
During a traffic stop, the officer in Rowell saw a bag of marijuana
protruding from the defendant’s shirt pocket.386 The officer arrested him
for possession of marijuana.387 The officer asked the defendant if there
were any weapons in the car.388 At first, the defendant denied having any,
but then he admitted that there was a shotgun.389 Once the defendant was
in the patrol car, the officer returned to the car and searched it.390 He
found the shotgun, a pistol, a wooden club, and a knife.391 Because the
stop took place in the parking lot of a high school, the defendant was
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378. 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
379. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); Thornton v. United States, 541
U.S. 615 (2004).
380. State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, 932 P.2d 1.
381. 1997-NMCA-081, 944 P.2d 276.
382. 2004-NMCA-081, 94 P.3d 18.
383. 2006-NMCA-006, 127 P.3d 1116.
384. 2008-NMSC-041, 188 P.3d 95.
385. Pittman, 2006-NMCA-006, ¶ 14, 127 P.3d at 1120 (alteration in original)
(quoting State v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 2001-NMSC-017, ¶ 15, 392, 25 P.3d 225).
386. Rowell, 2008-NMSC-041, ¶ 2, 188 P.3d at 97.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id. ¶ 3, 188 P.3d at 97.
391. Id.
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charged with four counts of carrying a deadly weapon on school premises,
a felony.392
Rejecting the state’s request to follow the federal rule, the court
commented:
The federal use of a search incident to arrest rationale to sanction
a warrantless search that has nothing to do with its underlying justification—preventing the arrestee from gaining access to weapons or evidence—is an anomaly that has been criticized widely.
The Belton-Thornton approach[393] has been described in the legal
literature as being devoid of a reasoned basis in constitutional
doctrine and lacking in reasonable guidance to police officers and
courts who must apply it.394

The court reasoned that, because the arrestee was locked in the back of
the patrol car, he could not have returned to his car to access weapons or
evidence.395
The court then examined whether exigent circumstances justified a
search of the car based on probable cause that the defendant possessed a
deadly weapon on school premises.396 The court noted that school was in
session and students were on a lunch break.397 The court concluded that
the officer did have exigent circumstances to conduct a warrantless
search.398 Rowell is unusual in its explicit, rather than implicit, use of the
flawed federal analysis rationale as the basis to depart from the federal
rule that existed at the time, allowing warrantless search of the passenger
compartment of a vehicle as a search incident, regardless of the
circumstances.
F. DWI Roadblocks: An Eight-Factor Test
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392. Id. ¶ 5, 188 P.3d at 97; see also NMSA § 30-7-2.1 (1978) (makes carrying a
deadly weapon on school premises a fourth degree felony).
393. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (allowed the search of the passenger compartment of a vehicle as a search incident to arrest, regardless of whether
the arrestee could actually access the interior of the vehicle).
394. Rowell, 2008-NMSC-041, ¶ 20, 188 P.3d at 100 (citations omitted).
395. Id. ¶ 25, 188 P.3d at 101.
396. Id. ¶ 27, 188 P.3d at 102.
397. Id. ¶ 33, 188 P.3d at 103.
398. Id.
399. 105 N.M. 655, 735 P.2d 1161 (1987).
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In City of Las Cruces v. Betancourt,399 the New Mexico Court of
Appeals held that sobriety roadblocks are not a per se violation of the
Fourth Amendment. In doing so, the court outlined eight factors “that
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will be considered in determining the reasonableness of a roadblock”400
under the Fourth Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently
held that sobriety roadblocks are not a violation of the Fourth Amendment if conducted in a reasonable manner.401 The Supreme Court balanced “the state’s interest in preventing accidents caused by drunk
drivers, the effectiveness of sobriety checkpoints in achieving that goal,
and the level of intrusion on an individual’s privacy caused by the checkpoints”402 to conclude that sobriety roadblocks conducted by the Michigan State Police were a reasonable seizure and did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.403
In State v. Madelena,404 the defendant argued that the eight
Betancourt factors used to evaluate the reasonableness of a DWI roadblock are not simply an aid to conducting a Fourth Amendment balancing
of interest but are, in fact, additional requirements based on article II,
section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution.405 The court of appeals recognized that Betancourt was based on the Fourth Amendment but held that
“[t]he eight factors impose additional and stricter guidelines than the balancing test used by the United States Supreme Court in Sitz.”406 The court
noted that the New Mexico Supreme Court “has departed from the
United States Supreme Court when the latter has abandoned or redefined established constitutional interpretation,”407 but the court did not
elaborate on the justification for departing from federal precedent. Ultimately, the court held that the roadblock at issue was constitutional as all
eight of the Betancourt factors were present.408 The court did not, however, specify which of the three balancing rationales justified use of a
stricter test based on article II, section 10 than the “reasonableness” test
based on the Fourth Amendment as articulated in Sitz.409
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400. The eight factors are the role of supervisory personnel, restrictions on discretion of field officers, safety, reasonable location, time and duration, indicia of official
nature of the roadblock, length and nature of detention, and advance publicity.
Betancourt, 105 N.M. at 658–59, 735 P.2d at 1164–65.
401. Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
402. Id. at 448–49. (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979)).
403. Id. at 455.
404. 121 N.M. 63, 908 P.2d 756 (Ct. App. 1995).
405. Id. at 65, 908 P.2d at 759.
406. Id. at 69, 908 P.2d at 762.
407. Id. at 68, 908 P.2d at 761.
408. Id. at 71, 908 P.2d at 764.
409. Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
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G. Border Patrol Checkpoints
Two topics concerning New Mexico’s deviation from federal precedent have been addressed in cases arising out of Border Patrol checkpoints. First is the permissible scope for questioning of individuals
stopped at such roadblocks. Second is whether Border Patrol agents must
have exigent circumstances to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle.
The New Mexico appellate courts have deviated from the federal rule on
both issues. In State v. Cardenas-Alvarez,410 the New Mexico Supreme
Court held that article II, section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution requires that questioning beyond the stated purpose of a Border Patrol
roadblock be based upon reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. In
State v. Snyder,411 the New Mexico Court of Appeals required that Border
Patrol officers have exigent circumstances to conduct a warrantless search
of a vehicle when there is probable cause or evidence that contraband is
located in the vehicle.
1. Permissible questioning at Border Patrol checkpoints

C M
Y K
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410. 2001-NMSC-017, 25 P.3d 225.
411. 1998-NMCA-166, 967 P.2d 843.
412. 2001-NMSC-017, 25 P.3d 225.
413. Id. ¶ 1, 25 P.3d at 227.
414. Id. ¶ 2, 25 P.3d at 227.
415. Id.
416. The defendant did not have anyone with him to assist with the second vehicle
and was traveling on a secondary highway, rather than the interstate, late at night. Id.
¶ 3, 25 P.3d at 227.
417. Id. ¶¶ 3–4, 25 P.3d at 227.
418. Id. ¶ 4, 25 P.3d at 227.
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The New Mexico Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether article II, section10 of the New Mexico Constitution limits questioning by
Border Patrol agents at checkpoints in State v. Cardenas-Alverez.412 The
defendant, a resident alien, was stopped at a permanent checkpoint driving a truck with Mexican license plates.413 The Border Patrol agent asked
him several questions concerning his travel itinerary.414 The defendant
said he was driving from El Paso to Albuquerque in a vehicle he had
borrowed from a friend to pick up another vehicle he had purchased.415
Several things aroused the agent’s suspicion,416 so he ordered the defendant to go to a secondary inspection area where he obtained consent to
search the vehicle.417 With the assistance of a sniffer dog, the agent found
eighty-five pounds of marijuana in the gas tank.418
The court first addressed the federal rule:
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With regard to the scope of the detention, federal courts have held
that a routine stop may include more than questions regarding citizenship and immigration. “[A] few brief questions concerning
such things as vehicle ownership, cargo, destination and travel
plans may be appropriate [at a routine checkpoint stop] if reasonably related to the agent’s duty to prevent the unauthorized entry
of individuals into this country and to prevent the smuggling of
contraband.”419

The court held that the agent’s questioning of the defendant did not violate the federal rule.420
The court then addressed article II, section10 of the New Mexico
Constitution.421 Citing pre-Gomez cases,422 the court held the New Mexico
Constitution prohibits “the prolongation of a border checkpoint stop
once questions regarding citizenship and immigration status have been
answered, unless the officer conducting the stop reasonably suspects the
defendant of criminal activity.”423 The court concluded that the agent in
this case had not developed reasonable suspicion of criminal activity during his questioning about the defendant’s immigration status.424
The court then discussed the rationale for departing from federal
precedent. “We do not find flaw in the federal analysis, nor do we detect
structural differences between state and federal government that warrant
departure from federal precedent. Our examination of New Mexico law,
however, does reveal distinctive state characteristics that command our
departure from federal law governing border checkpoint detentions.”425
The distinctive state characteristic is “[t]he extra layer of protection from
unreasonable searches and seizures involving automobiles . . . of New
Mexico constitutional law.”426
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419. Id. ¶ 9, 25 P.3d at 229 (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Rascon-Ortiz, 994 F.2d 749, 752 (1993)).
420. Id.
421. Beyond the scope of this article is the issue of whether the New Mexico Constitution applies to the conduct of federal officers in a prosecution in a New Mexico
court. Suffice to say, the majority held that it does. Id. ¶ 20, 25 P.3d at 233.
422. State v. Galloway, 116 N.M. 8, 859 P.2d 476 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Affsprung, 115 N.M. 546, 854 P.2d 873 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Estrada, 111 N.M. 798,
810 P.2d 817 (Ct. App. 1991). These cases based their holdings on the Fourth
Amendment.
423. Cardenas-Alvarez, 2001-NMSC-017, ¶ 16, 25 P.3d at 231.
424. Id. ¶ 20, 25 P.3d at 233.
425. Id. ¶ 14, 25 P.3d at 230–31.
426. Id. ¶ 15, 25 P.3d at 231.
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2. Warrantless searches of vehicles at Border Patrol checkpoints

1998-NMCA-166, 967 P.2d 843.
Id. ¶ 2, 967 P.2d at 844.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3, 967 P.2d at 845.
Id. ¶ 9, 967 P.2d at 846.
Id. ¶ 18, 967 P.2d at 848.
Id. ¶ 15. 967 P.2d at 847.
Id.
Id.
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The second issue that has arisen at Border Patrol checkpoints is
whether warrantless searches require exigent circumstances in the absence of valid consent. Not surprisingly, the New Mexico Court of Appeals has concluded that exigent circumstances are required. Two cases
involving the same Border Patrol checkpoint near Orogrande illustrate
the fact-specific nature of the inquiry as to the existence of exigency.
In State v. Snyder,427 the defendant appeared to be nervous and was
trembling when asked about his citizenship and itinerary.428 He said he
was traveling from Phoenix, Arizona to Garden City, Kansas.429
Orogrande is not along the most direct route between those two cities.430
The agent asked if he could have a drug dog sniff around the vehicle, to
which the defendant consented.431 The dog alerted and marijuana was
then discovered in the spare tire located underneath the rear of the defendant’s truck.432
The court first determined that the search did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.433 The court then determined that the New Mexico Constitution does regulate the conduct of federal officers when the prosecution
is brought in state court.434 The court noted that, while excluding evidence
obtained by federal agents may not serve to deter federal agents, the New
Mexico Supreme Court has held that the New Mexico exclusionary rule,
unlike the federal exclusionary rule, serves purposes other than deterrence of the police.435 The New Mexico rule examines whether there was
a violation of the constitution and, if so, the evidence will be suppressed.436 Thus, in New Mexico it is irrelevant whom the government
actor was that violated the constitution or whether the exclusion will have
a deterrent effect.437
Finally, the court examined whether the agent had sufficient exigency to forego obtaining a warrant. The court noted that the check occurred at 7:30 p.m., there were only two agents at the checkpoint, and
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Id. ¶ 21, 967 P.2d at 849.
Id. ¶ 24, 967 P.2d at 849.
Id.
2003-NMCA-079, 70 P.3d 1277.
Id. ¶ 2, 70 P.3d at 1279.
Id.
Id. ¶ 4, 70 P.3d at 1279.
Id. ¶ 5, 70 P.3d at 1279.
Id.
Id. ¶ 13, 70 P.3d at 1281.
Id. ¶ 15, 70 P.3d at 1281.
Id.
Id. ¶ 19, 70 P.3d at 1282.
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that the nearest magistrate was thirty-five miles away in Alamogordo.438
The court questioned whether the intrusiveness of detaining the defendant while one agent drove to Alamogordo to get a warrant, which “may
ripen into a de facto arrest, would be any less than the intrusiveness of
conducting an immediate warrantless search.”439 “In this situation, it was
not unreasonable for the agents to believe that exigent circumstances justified an immediate warrantless search. . . .”440
Five years later, in State v. Gallegos,441 the court addressed another
appeal arising out of the Orogrande checkpoint. It was 8 p.m. when the
defendant was stopped at the checkpoint.442 She was visibly trembling
when the agent asked her about her travel plans.443 Upon request, she
gave the agent permission to look in the trunk.444 Finding no contraband,
the agent then obtained consent for the drug dog to be brought over to
sniff the vehicle.445 The dog alerted, and agents found marijuana hidden
under the foam in the rear bumper.446
The court began by noting the similarities between this case and
Snyder.447 However, in this case, there were three, rather than two, agents
on site; there was a fax machine available; and there was a magistrate
judge on duty.448 The court noted: “[t]he State offered no evidence to
show that the time necessary to obtain a warrant would be excessive,
thus, raising the possibility of de facto arrest. Consequently, we limit our
holding in Snyder to the specific circumstance of that case.”449 The court
went on to suggest that, in light of the fact that Orogrande is a permanent
checkpoint and conducting searches for contraband is not unexpected,
the Border Patrol needed to have procedures in place to minimize the
time necessary to obtain a warrant.450
Neither Snyder nor Gallegos articulated a rationale for departing
from the federal Carroll Doctrine, allowing warrantless searches of vehi-
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cles based on probable cause, regardless of whether any exigency exists.
Both cases simply cited Gomez as controlling precedent.451
H. Probationer/Parolee Searches
In State v. Marquart,452 the New Mexico Court of Appeals held, contrary to the federal rule, that the exclusionary rule applies to probation
revocation hearings under article II, section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution. The defendant was on probation for a drug charge and the probation revocation hearing was held because methamphetamine was found
on his person during a traffic stop.453 The court of appeals noted that the
majority of federal circuits had ruled that the exclusionary rule does not
apply to probation revocation hearings.454 The court held that the logic of
Gutierrez,455 however, mandated that the exclusionary rule apply to probation hearings in New Mexico.456 Since the purpose of the exclusionary
rule “is to effectuate in the pending case the constitutional right of the
accused,”457 and it is not just a “mere judicial remedy”458 to deter police, it
does not matter that the hearing to determine whether the defendant
committed some wrongful act for which he should be punished is a probation revocation hearing rather than a criminal trial.
Although the court did not explicitly state it, Marquart appeared to
rely on distinctive state characteristics and flawed federal analysis as the
reasons for departing from the federal rule. Gutierrez, on which the court
relied, had held that the New Mexico exclusionary rule serves purposes
other than the sole purpose served by the federal exclusionary rule, i.e.,
to deter police conduct.459 In doing so, Gutierrez had criticized the federal
rule allowing a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

In California v. Greenwood,460 the U.S. Supreme Court held that it is
not a violation of the Fourth Amendment for the police to seize and
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451. State v. Snyder, 1998-NMCA-166, ¶ 1, 967 P.2d 843, 844; Gallegos, 2003NMCA-079, ¶ 10, 70 P.3d at 1280.
452. 1997-NMCA-090, ¶ 1, 945 P.2d 1027, 1028.
453. Id. ¶ 5, 945 P.2d at 1028.
454. Id. ¶ 10, 945 P.2d at 1029. The U.S. Supreme Court has since ruled that the
federal exclusionary rule does not apply to parole revocation hearings. Penn. Bd. of
Probation v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 359 (1998).
455. Oliver, supra note 99.
456. Marquart, 1997-NMCA-090, ¶ 17, 945 P.2d at 1031.
457. Id.
458. Id.
459. See discussion supra note 99.
460. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).

33613-nmx_43-2 Sheet No. 66 Side B

I. Garbage

33613-nmx_43-2 Sheet No. 67 Side A

02/11/2014 12:56:22

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\43-2\NMX205.txt

Fall 2013]

unknown

THE NEW FEDERALISM

Seq: 45

31-JAN-14

14:16

485

C M
Y K

R

02/11/2014 12:56:22

461. 2006-NMCA-098, 142 P.3d 933.
462. See supra text accompanying notes 374–76. The test requires that there be
both a subjectively and an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy for there to
be Fourth Amendment protection of a privacy interest.
463. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40.
464. 2006-NMCA-098, 142 P.3d 933.
465. Id. ¶ 3, 142 P.3d at 935.
466. Id. ¶ 4, 142 P.3d at 935.
467. Id. ¶ 5, 142 P.3d at 935. Included in the trash was a gas bill for the residence in
the defendant’s name.
468. Id. ¶ 20, 142 P.3d at 939.
469. Id. ¶ 22, 142 P.3d at 940.
470. Id. ¶ 24, 142 P.3d at 940.
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search garbage that has been put on the curb in opaque bags for collection by trash haulers. In State v. Granville,461 the New Mexico Court of
Appeals used the distinctive state characteristics rationale to deviate from
Greenwood.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Greenwood applied Justice Harlan’s
two-part test outlined in his concurring opinion in Katz v. United States.462
The gist of the Greenwood ruling is that society does not find an expectation of privacy in trash to be reasonable because it is accessible to other
members of the public, to trash collectors, and to animals.463
In Granville,464 the New Mexico Court of Appeals followed the distinctive state characteristics rationale to deviate from Greenwood. The
police seized the defendant’s trash bags from trash containers in the alley
behind his brother’s house.465 Based on evidence found in the trash bags
and additional information supplied by three confidential informants, police officers obtained a search warrant for the residence.466 Officers found
drugs, and the defendant was charged with possession of cocaine and
marijuana.467
In what is probably the most thorough discussion of New Mexico’s
rationale for departing from federal precedent, the court began by noting
that the majority of state courts have upheld the warrantless and suspicionless search and seizure of garbage.468 The court then cited several
state cases that have held there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in
garbage because of the “indicia of personal, private affairs that can be
found in an individual’s garbage.”469 The court noted that “[o]ur Supreme
Court has emphasized New Mexico’s strong preference for warrants in
order to preserve the values of privacy and sanctity of the home that are
embodied by [article II, section10]”470 and that this principle was applicable to garbage searches. The court stated that the fact that strangers
might rummage through a person’s trash does not mean that there is not
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a reasonable expectation of privacy.471 The expectation is that only the
garbage collection company will remove the bags and that the bags will
be taken to the landfill unopened.472 The constitution protects people
from intrusions by the government, not private parties.473 Finally, the
court pointed out that the New Mexico Constitution uses the term
“homes and effects”474 and that garbage contains “evidence of intimate
and private affairs that are conducted within the home. . . .”475 Therefore,
“an individual in New Mexico has a reasonable expectation of privacy in
his garbage placed for collection in an opaque container and . . . this privacy interest is protected by Article II, Section 10.”476 Granville is unusual
in that it uses the distinctive state characteristics rationale and spends
more time discussing those unique characteristics than criticizing the federal rule.
J. Confidential Informants
In re Shon Daniel K.477 reaffirmed that the Aguilar-Spinelli test478 is
still required for article II, section 10. In that case, a search warrant was
issued after two “concerned citizens” told officers that some juveniles,
including the respondent, were selling stolen liquor from a residence.479
One of the sources had seen the liquor at the house within forty-eight
hours of the issuance of the warrant. The court found the affidavit insufficient as it contained no indicia of the reliability of these two informants
other than “they came forward of their own . . . accord, without promise
of reward or special consideration for any pending charges.”480
K. Arrest for Non-jailable Offenses

Id. ¶ 30, 142 P.3d at 942.
Id. ¶ 31, 142 P.3d at 943.
Id.
As opposed to the Fourth Amendment’s “houses and effects.”
Granville, 2006-NMCA-098, ¶ 33, 142 P.3d at 944 (emphasis added).
Id.
1998-NMCA-069, 959 P.2d 553.
See discussion supra note 78.
In re Shon Daniel K., 1998-NMCA-069, ¶ 3, 959 P.2d at 556.
Id.
532 U.S. 318, 323 (2001).
2005-NMCA-141, ¶ 1, 125 P.3d 647, 647.
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In Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,481 the U.S. Supreme Court held that
arrest for a non-jailable offense does not violate the Fourth Amendment
as long as probable cause exists. In State v. Rodarte,482 the New Mexico
Court of Appeals held that article II, section 10 of the New Mexico Con-
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483. Id. ¶ 3, 125 P.3d at 648. Section 60-7B-1 provides for penalties fines and community service for a first offense. Second and third or subsequent offenses may include suspension of the offender’s drivers license. NMSA 1978 § 60-7B-1 (2004).
484. Rodarte, 2005-NMCA-141, ¶ 3, 125 P.3d at 648.
485. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 323.
486. Id. at 353.
487. Id. at 364.
488. Id. at 366 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).
489. Rodarte, 2005-NMCA-141, ¶ 13, 125 P.3d at 650.
490. Id. ¶ 14, 125 P.3d at 650.
491. 2006-NMCA-052, 134 P.3d 800.
492. Id. ¶ 1, 134 P.3d at 801 (methamphetamine and a syringe were found on his
person at the jail).
493. NMSA 1978, § 66-8-122 (1985).
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stitution does not allow for the arrest of individuals for crimes for which
the specified punishment does not include incarceration.
The defendant in Rodarte was arrested for being a minor in possession of alcohol,483 and a small amount of cocaine was subsequently found
in the back seat of the patrol car after he was transported to jail.484 The
Rodarte court first took notice of Atwater,485 in which the U.S. Supreme
Court held that arrest for a non-jailable offense does not violate the
Fourth Amendment as long as probable cause that the arrestee violated
the law exists.486 The court then reviewed Justice O’Connor’s dissent, in
which she employed a balancing test to conclude that the severity of the
intrusion into privacy that is caused by arrest is not outweighed by the
government’s “limited” interests in arresting for such minor offenses.487
Instead of a bright-line rule always allowing arrest for non-jailable offenses, she “would require that when there is probable cause to believe
that a fine-only offense has been committed, the police officer should issue a citation unless the officer is ‘able to point to specific and articulable
facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the additional] intrusion’ of a full custodial arrest.”488
The New Mexico Court of Appeals noted prior New Mexico Supreme Court decisions that eschewed “bright-line, per se rules.”489 The
court then adopted the rule suggested by Justice O’Connor.490 The court
did not explain its reasons to deviate from federal precedent. Its reference to prior New Mexico Supreme Court decisions criticizing federal
“bright-line, per-se rules” and its reliance on Justice O’Connor’s dissent
criticizing the majority opinion in Atwater, implicates the flawed federal
analysis rationale.
The next year, the court of appeals addressed a similar issue in State
v. Bricker.491 The defendant in Bricker was arrested for driving with a
suspended license.492 The applicable statute493 provides that a driver
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should be arrested for this offense only if the license was suspended for
specified reasons.494 The reason the defendant’s license was suspended
was unknown as the state had not introduced evidence on that issue.495
Therefore, the court concluded that the arrest was a violation of the
statute.496
The court did acknowledge that this case was different from Atwater
and Rodarte because the penalty for driving on a suspended license can
include incarceration.497 The court held, however, that the potential penalty “alters nothing. [The New Mexico] Legislature has stated in no uncertain terms that persons who violate a misdemeanor covered by Section
66-8-123(A) shall be cited and released from custody. That the traffic offense is jailable is irrelevant. Jailability cannot justify overlooking an unlawful custodial arrest. . . .”498 The court then went on to hold that
violation of a statute can be considered in evaluating the constitutionality
of the government action.499 The court concluded that arresting officer’s
statutory violation also constituted a violation of article II, section 10 of
the New Mexico Constitution.500
The court referred to Rodarte and Justice O’Connor’s dissent in
Atwater as providing the rationale for departing from federal precedent.501 As in Rodarte, the court did not elaborate as to which rationale it
relied upon, but, just as in Rodarte, the court’s reliance on Justice
O’Connor’s criticism of Atwater certainly implies that the court feels that
the federal analysis is flawed.
VI. CONCLUSION
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494. Bricker, 2006-NMCA-052, ¶ 5, 134 P.3d at 801. The specified reasons are for a
DWI conviction, for refusing to submit to a blood-alcohol (B/A) test, or for driving
with a B/A higher than .08 percent (person 21 or older) or .02 percent (person under
the age of 21).
495. Id. ¶ 6, 134 P.3d at 802.
496. Id.
497. Id. ¶ 27, 134 P.3d at 807. Section 66-5-39 provides for a penalty of up to 364
days in jail. NMSA 1978, § 66-5-39 (1993).
498. Bricker, 2006-NMCA-052, ¶ 27, 134 P.3d at 807.
499. See id. ¶ 28, 134 P.3d at 807.
500. Id. ¶ 30, 134 P.3d at 808.
501. See id. ¶¶ 22–27, 134 P.3d at 805–07.
502. See Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, 932 P.2d 1.
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Following the 1997 decision in State v. Gomez,502 New Mexico courts
have provided greater search and seizure protection under the New Mexico Constitution than is available under the U.S. Constitution. However,
in the majority of cases in which the New Mexico appellate courts have
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departed from the federal rule in a given area, the courts do not tell us
upon which of the rationales for departure they are relying.503 The New
Mexico appellate courts have shown a particular distaste for bright-line
rules promulgated by the U.S. Supreme Court, which do not effectuate
the actual purpose underlying a particular search. For example, the reason that officers can conduct warrantless exigent circumstances searches
is that there is a concern that delay in obtaining a warrant may result in
the evidence being concealed or destroyed. Unlike the U.S. Supreme
Court, the New Mexico courts are unwilling to allow searches of automobiles based upon probable cause unless there truly is such a concern.504
Nor will a search incident to arrest of an automobile be allowed unless
there truly is a concern that the arrested person could lunge to obtain a
weapon or evidence.505
Flawed federal analysis remains the most often-used rationale for
departure from the federal rule, whether it is explicitly stated in the opinion or impliedly applied by the inclusion of substantial criticism of federal
precedent in the opinion. While both Cordova506 and Sutton507 were cited
in Gomez as examples of the distinctive state characteristics rationale, a
reading of the cases reveals strongly implied criticisms of federal cases
and only passing mention of any distinctive state characteristics. Similarly, several post-Gomez cases that declare distinctive state characteristics as the reason for departing from federal precedent also impliedly rely
on flawed federal analysis by including substantial criticism of the logic
underlying the federal precedent. These include Garcia,508 Ochoa,509 and
Leyva.510 Cases that do not provide any reason for departure from the
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503. See supra notes 125–27 and accompanying text.
504. See State v. Arredondo, 1997-NMCA-081, ¶ 26, 944 P.2d 267, 284; State v.
Warsaw, 1998-NMCA-044, ¶ 19, 956 P.2d 139, 143.
505. See State v. Rowell, 2008-NMSC-041, 188 P.3d 95.
506. See State v. Cordova, 109 N.M. 211, 217, 784 P.2d 30, 36 (retaining AguilarSpinelli as the test for evaluating unnamed sources as the basis for probable cause).
507. See State v. Sutton, 112 N.M. 449, 455, 816 P.2d 518, 524 (Ct. App. 1991)
(indicating that article II, section 10 might protect “open fields” where there is a legitimate expectation of privacy).
508. See State v. Garcia 2009-NMSC-046, ¶ 37, 217 P.3d 1032, 1042. (holding that a
person is not “seized” pursuant to article II, section 10, unless a reasonable person
would not feel free to leave).
509. See State v. Ochoa, 2009-NMCA-002, ¶ 1, 206 P.3d 143, 146 (holding that
pretext stops violate article II, section 10).
510. See State v. Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 23, 250 P.3d 861, 870 (requiring reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of questioning of an individual in investigatory
detention beyond the scope of the original reason for the detention). This case also
relied on the “distinctive state characteristics” rationale by noting that article II, section 10 is “calibrated differently” than the Fourth Amendment.
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federal rule also often include substantial criticism of the applicable federal rule. These include Arredondo,511 Madelena,512 Rodarte,513 and
Bricker.514 Two post-Gomez cases, Cardenez-Alverez515 and Granville516
are rare in that they focused their analysis primarily on the distinctive
state characteristics reasoning, and no post-Gomez case appears to rely
on the structural differences between federal and state government or
undeveloped federal analogs rationales. Rowell517 is unique in explicitly
relying on the flawed federal analysis rationale. Regardless of the rationale used by the court in doing so, the effect is to provide greater search
and seizure protections under article II, section 10 of the New Mexico
Constitution than the U.S. Constitution’s Fourth Amendment.
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511. State v. Arredondo, 1997-NMCA-081, ¶ 15, 944 P.2d 276, 281 (restricting warrantless searches of vehicles to situations where actual exigency exists).
512. State v. Madalena, 121 N.M. 63, 69, 908 P.2d 756, 762 (holding that the New
Mexico test for determining the reasonableness of sobriety roadblocks is stricter than
the Fourth Amendment test).
513. State v. Rodarte, 2005-NMCA-141, ¶ 1, 125 P.3d 647, 647 (holding that arrest
for an offense that does not include incarceration as a possible penalty must be justified by an actual need to detain the suspect).
514. State v. Bricker, 2006-NMCA-052, ¶ 23, 134 P.3d 800, 805–06 (arrest for an
offense defined by statute as “non-jailable,” in that a citation should be issued in lieu
of arrest, may also violate article II, section 10).
515. State v. Cardenez-Alvarez, 2001-NMSC-017, ¶ 20, 25 P.3d 225, 233 (holding
that Border Patrol agents may only expand questioning at their checkpoints beyond
the topics of citizenship and immigration status based upon reasonable suspicion).
516. State v. Granville, 2006-NMCA-098, ¶ 1, 142 P.3d 933, 935 (finding a reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage placed on the curb for collection).
517. State v. Rowell, 2008-NMSC-041, ¶ 25, 188 P.3d 95, 101 (restricting search
incident to arrest to situations where there is an actual concern the suspect could
obtain a weapon or evidence from the interior of a vehicle).

